Interagency Coordination of Security Operations in a Large U.S. Seaport by Levy, Edmund
Walden University
ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral StudiesCollection
2015
Interagency Coordination of Security Operations
in a Large U.S. Seaport
Edmund Levy
Walden University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Transportation Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been






College of Management and Technology 
 
This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by 
Edmund Levy 
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
and that any and all revisions required by  
the review committee have been made. 
 
Review Committee 
Dr. David Gould, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty 
Dr. Lilburn Hoehn, Committee Member, Management Faculty 
Dr. James Bowman, University Reviewer, Management Faculty 
 
Chief Academic Officer 







Interagency Coordination of Security Operations in a Large U.S. Seaport 
by 





MBA, Pepperdine University, 1977 
BBA, University of Texas (Austin), 1970 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 






Protecting U.S. transportation hubs against a wide variety of security threats, 
while avoiding undue interference with the normal operations of the hubs, is one of the 
greatest challenges facing security agencies. The problem addressed in this study was the 
limited information on the contributing factors to seaport security. The purpose of this 
case study was to explore issues that can inhibit efficiency of security agency operation 
and collaboration and to identify actions that have enhanced collaboration. Based on 
theories of organizational development, leadership, and security tradecraft, this study 
examined the activities related to maintenance of security at a large California seaport. 
Research questions focused on the types of relationships that exist among supervisors and 
employees, how these relationships were formed, types of conflicts among organizations, 
and methods of task allocation among agencies. Individuals who worked for security 
agencies were randomly selected for participation (n =20). Data gathering was primarily 
through face-to-face interviews in an open-ended format and augmented by observations 
of people working within the research environment. An inductive approach to data 
collection, with open and axial coding, was used to identify themes and patterns. Key 
findings included themes of trust among seaport security personnel and threats such as 
smuggling, sabotage, and terrorism. Conclusions and recommendations may help security 
officials improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security resources. Positive social 
change may result from enhanced measures that increase security while avoiding threats 
to commercial activity and individual civil liberties. 
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This work is dedicated to the men and women whose diligence and professional 
dedication continue to provide the rest of our society with the safe and secure 
environment that is indispensable to our way of life. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Threats to the safety of port facilities in the United States have grown to alarming 
proportions and are increasing. Malevolent parties are growing in violence and ingenuity, 
with the result that decreased economic activity and the deaths of innocents are 
substantial possibilities. Port security has, of course, always been a major requirement in 
any seaport, and various means for providing that security have existed for generations. 
Since the attacks on U.S. soil of September 11, 2001, the nature of the threat and the 
complexity of the security task have become both greater and more urgent. U.S. seacoast 
facilities are subject to jurisdictions of more than one official agency, and each agency 
has its own capabilities and priorities. This situation, while necessary, complicates the 
tasks of providing seamless security. To overcome the complications, close coordination 
among agencies across jurisdictional boundaries is required. The degree to which this 
coordination has been successfully implemented and maintained offers an interesting and 
useful topic of investigation.  
This chapter includes a general background of the issues of interest as well as of 
the problems that have been addressed. This is followed by descriptions of the general 
purpose, nature, and procedures employed in this research study. The scope, assumptions, 
and limitations are also described. Finally, the significance and potential further use of 
the study are delineated. 
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Background of the Study 
Existing research and theory literature have provided substantial material related 
to various issues in the study. Even so, there is a lack of key information about the 
specific action of theoretical models in the field of interagency collaboration among 
organizations charged with security at large transportation hubs. Some studies, such as 
Lisle (2013), indicated that there were problems with conflicting interests and priorities 
in these kinds of facilities, but the dynamics of the conflicts were not well understood, 
and the means of resolving them had not been adequately explored. Chalk and Rosenau 
(2004) noted that U.S. security environments were especially complicated because of the 
multiple agencies, overlapping jurisdictions, and differing policies, procedures, and 
ethical rules. In general, Eriksson and Rhinard (2009) observed many of the kinds of 
issues that are of interest in this work and concluded that much more research will be 
needed to fully identify, comprehend, and mitigate the issues.  
My preliminary approach of some personnel working in the selected research 
environment revealed that participants would be both available and willing to take part in 
such a study. In addition to the availability of participants, there also proved to be a 
plentiful supply of documentary data to inform and guide the design and conduct of the 
study. The data included books written by experts in various aspects of the study and 
articles describing research that was useful in defining the need for the current study, for 
constructing the study, and for evaluating its findings. Despite the availability of 
supporting theory and research data, current practitioners in the research environment, as 
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well as researchers who have conducted related studies, have acknowledged that greater 
understanding of the dynamics of security activity is needed. In addition to the access that 
has been provided in support of the study, this research has been shown to be both 
necessary and practicable. For example, Dulles (2006) explained that there are certain 
things that need to be known in any threat situation before appropriate courses of action 
can be determined. Most of these pieces of information can only be discovered through 
field research in the environments where they are relevant. Aydinli (2010) found that the 
sociology of terrorism and of counterterrorism, as new fields of study, were in need of 
substantial further examination and research. It thus followed there existed both 
opportunity and need for such studies. 
Variety of Threats 
 The variety of threat sources as well as threat types greatly complicates the 
difficulty of preparing to detect and neutralize the threats (Eski, 2011). In addition to 
many types of terrorist threats, there are also other criminal activities, ranging from 
simple tariff-avoidance smuggling to transportation of illegal immigrants, importation of 
proscribed materials, and theft of cargoes. These and other potential crimes add to the 
complexity of the security task and require the participation of numerous intelligence and 
enforcement agencies. 
According to the content of the Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) training 
program, operated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there were more than 
12 different types of security threats, with more than 60 different origins of the threats 
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facing U.S. infrastructure facilities. Feldt et al. (2013) listed these threat types along with 
descriptions of some origins and motivations of those who pose these threats. Most of 
these threats focus specifically on transportation hubs such as seaports. Sandoz (2012) 
described the international nature of the threats and the complexities involved in 
assessing them. Caldwell (2012) related the threats to the kinds of responses that DHS 
should be structured to make in the face of this wide variety of threats. At the same time, 
the task of addressing these threats must be done within the context of continuing, 
efficient operation of the protected facilities. Alitok (2011) offered a description of this 
dichotomous condition: “Maintaining efficient port operations sometimes conflicts with 
port security measures addressing worldwide concerns about terrorism, drug smuggling, 
and crime” (p. 1). 
Belzer and Swan (2012) provided one example of the complexity of the task of 
assessing the threat. This analysis examined the potential effects of low-wage transport 
workers’ vulnerability to economic temptation combined with the increasing possibility 
(and increasing incidences) of smugglers or terrorists gaining access to shipping 
containers after they have been loaded and before they reach their destinations. Security 
personnel must be aware of these kinds of possibilities, devise means of combating the 
various techniques that can be used to access containers in transit, and do so in a manner 
that does not unduly hamper the process of transporting the suspect container (and all the 




Moreover, the task must be completed, day in and day out, while the normal 
course of commerce continues. Additionally, this is only one aspect of the security task 
that the responsible agencies must carry out on an ongoing basis. This example, along 
with many other types and sources of threats, constitute the collective job of all 
participating agencies. 
Mix of Agencies 
To help rationalize the disparate agencies that must be involved, the US 
Deartment of Homeland Security has implemented a new collection of management 
processes, known by the general term of collaborative public management (CPM), and 
has shown some limited promise in helping to reconcile differences in political, 
institutional, and professional objectives and approaches for achieving security in and 
around transportation hubs (Garrett, 2010). According to Garrett's study, there were 
benefits to be gained through implementation of interagency networks, but there were 
also problems associated with them. Such implementations were seen to offer 
opportunities for collaboration, but also opened issues associated with organizational 
rivalries, interference with existing cooperative protocols, resistance to changes in 
policies and procedures, and assignment of people to tasks for which they may not have 
had sufficient training or experience. The indications were that the benefits of 
interagency networks must be gained in order to successfully deal with growing security 
threats, but that further study of the dynamics of implementation were needed before such 
large-scale integrative actions could fully yield their intended benefits. 
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Disparate Ethical Standards 
Another critical issue concerned differences in ethical standards and rules among 
organizations. Even when general ethical principles are held in common, specific rules 
for upholding these principles may differ from one organization to another, with the 
potential for real or perceived violations of ethical standards. Such violations can 
undermine internal morale and cooperative spirit, diminishing public confidence in the 
agencies involved. Adams and Balfour (2010) studied one such type of clash of ethical 
rules involving differences between ethical expectations of security personnel who were 
direct employees of government agencies and employees who were members of 
organizations that provided contract services to the government. Although Adams and 
Balfour focused on contract services, their findings revealed potential problems that can 
occur between government and nongovernment entities as well as within interagency 
networks of government organizations. A key finding was that it was possible for security 
organizations to comply strictly with the letter of the law while operating in ways that 
were counter to some goals of the greater, combined organizations. This fact emphasized 
the difficulty of establishing governing rules for disparate organizations when those who 
make the rules may lack detailed understanding of the functional nature of the governed 
organizations while members of the governed organizations do not possess full 
understanding of the intent of the new rules to which they are subject. 
The issue of ethical rules that may not be held in common among participating 
organizations may be an additional confounding factor in efforts to establish closely 
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coordinated action to provide security in transportation hubs. Compliance with general 
ethical standards and specific rules for gathering and disseminating security data may 
also conflict with other kinds of ethical standards, as well as conflicting with operational 
imperatives involving public safety. Such conflicts were identified and explained by 
Olson (2006) and proved to be significant factors for consideration in the current research 
project. In addition to honoring internal and interagency protocols, security practitioners 
were shown to face frequent conflicts between operational, public safety, and societal 
needs and norms. 
The line between legitimate, effective counterintelligence activity and the 
protection of civil liberties is often obscure (Olson, 2006). Although there are myriad 
laws and regulations in place to help manage this inherent conflict, dynamic security 
situations have often challenged even the most conscientious security practitioner. Even 
so, given the indispensable nature of public cooperation with and faith in the security 
agencies and activities, maintaining ethical standards and public perception of those 
standards is imperative for all security practitioners. When conflicts—even innocent 
conflicts—among agencies come into public view, public confidence can be undermined. 
Thus, both the fact and appearance of strict ethical practices have continued to be vital to 
effective execution of security operations.  
Roles and Responsibilities 
In addition to potential ethical misunderstandings, the mere task of developing 
detailed descriptions of roles and responsibilities for the various agencies involved in 
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local area security can be far more difficult than originally envisioned. According to 
Oliver (2009), establishment of umbrella organizational structures may be reasonably 
achievable if sufficient funding is provided and if all participating agencies concur that 
there is benefit to be gained. Even so, Oliver found that general agreement on the basic 
structure and hierarchy of such organizations did not result in effective and unequivocal 
division of tasks, or full and detailed understanding of roles, responsibilities, and 
authorizations to act. Oliver described the goal of defining such roles as both elusive and 
contradictory. 
The elusive nature of such definitions resulted from a variety of factors, including 
differences in legal definitions of terms, differences among laws and policies across 
jurisdictional lines, interorganizational rivalries, and failures of communication in the 
process of constructing the larger organization. Although official efforts to clarify and 
remove conflict from roles and jurisdictional boundaries have continued, conflicts have 
continued to arise, and such conflicts unavoidably cause disruption, confusion, and 
diminution of trust. Any actions that have helped to reduce incidences of these kinds of 
conflicts should be identified and described to help those responsible for managing 
jurisdictional boundaries to also maintain cooperative spirit in the process. 
Existing Relationships 
Finally, establishment of newly chartered organizations can be impeded by 
existing relationships. In the absence of formal, interagency relationships, it is not 
unusual for individuals and small groups from different agencies to develop their own 
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cooperative protocols. Such working protocols may complicate the task of formalizing 
distribution of roles and responsibilities, especially when high-level officials who may 
not be aware of the working-level arrangements that already exist negotiate the structure 
of the formal organization. Division of task through negotiation is generally as much 
political as practical, influenced by competition for resources, jurisdictional ambiguities, 
and other factors that may not be visible to personnel who are accustomed to focusing on 
immediate, working-level tasks. 
According to Chenoweth and Clarke (2010), such factors can prove to be 
confounding if not identified and dealt with in a manner that fosters substantial 
communication, both vertical and horizontal, throughout the affected organizations. The 
higher the level of ultimate authority, the more difficult it can be to achieve efficient and 
effective cooperation among lower-level agencies. Fostering of cooperative relationships 
“among multiple jurisdictions and actors to overcome this collective action problem is 
proving more difficult than anticipated by national policy makers” (Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010, p. 495). 
This same study also revealed that sensitivity to capabilities, preferences, and 
habits within lower level agencies is indispensable to successful integration of individual 
organizations into an effectively functioning whole. Failure of authority figures to 
recognize existing power structures and roles is a recurring source of difficulty. 
Successful integration, then, would seem to depend upon recognition and accommodation 
of existing relationships, even while satisfying political and administrative imperatives 
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that are associated with higher-level policy, externally imposed demands, and negotiated 
allocation of funding. 
Mix of Issues 
Thus, establishment of new interagency organizations for combining security 
resources places substantial requirements on political and administrative leadership. 
Understanding of all potential threats is, of course, essential, but this is only one facet of 
a complex set of issues. It is also necessary to understand the capabilities and limitations 
of all of the agencies that may be called upon to contribute to the common security 
program. Sensitivity to the many local pressures and expectations of participating 
agencies and the specific communities they serve is also indispensable to effectively 
organizing the network of organizations. Effective negotiation is vital but must be 
conducted within a context of existing relationships and working protocols.  
All of these issues must be identified and comprehended in order to build the 
kinds of organizational relationships that will optimally employ the many, varied 
resources that will be needed to face and defeat the growing variety and sophistication of 
security threats that confront the U.S. transportation infrastructure. It is vital for all 
concerned to remain cognizant of the fact that security agencies are made up of people in 
the same way as any other type of organization. Snyder (1993) explained that existence 
of official direction and policy did not substitute for onsite management and motivation 
of individuals in the organization. Chalk and Rosenau (2004) elaborated on some of the 
types of real-time issues and organization-specific processes that tend to spread the need 
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for active management and control throughout all levels of security organizations. The 
issues and challenges associated with building and motivating these groups of individuals 
remain the same ones that managers of other organizations face, with the added dynamic 
of responsibility for the safety and security of everyone in their operating environment. 
Problem Statement 
The problem was that there is limited information regarding the contributing 
factors to seaport security. Port security operations, while vital to the continued, safe 
operation of port facilities, also entail activities and restrictions that have the potential of 
interfering with the very functions at the port that the security organizations exist to 
protect. Maintenance of physical security in the study site seaport is a task that 
exemplifies the larger issue of security in the entire United States (Sandoz, 2012). The 
imperative of protecting lives and property from a wide range of potential threats while 
avoiding undue interference in the ongoing functioning of the affected facilities is a 
complex, expensive, and unpredictable requirement. These imperatives have motivated 
an increasingly centralized, hierarchical management structure under the primary 
direction of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Under this organization, state and local security organizations have been partially 
funded and their functions incorporated into a large, collaborative group, with each 
making its own contribution while remaining answerable to its own individual command 
and political structures. Absence of any major breaches of security would seem to 
indicate that the new arrangement is working successfully, but the question remains 
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whether the new processes are superior to the informal relationships that previously 
existed (and that may still exist) among some members, given that security breaches did 
not occur while they were in place (Kempfer, 2011). Thus, identification of some of the 
organizational dynamics that have resulted in the successful melding of existing 
relationships in the research environment could help to enhance and further develop the 
collaborative operation. In addition, detection and description of any remaining 
difficulties and potential remedies may help build upon this effort. 
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore issues that can hamper 
efficiency of security agency operation and collaboration and to identify actions that have 
enhanced collaboration. To do this, I have explored the activities of security agency 
personnel and such others as were considered appropriate to discover factors that are 
associated with collaboration within the study environment. The objective of these 
observations and enquiries was to explore the perceptions of participants regarding the 
implementation of interagency collaboration protocols. Corollary explorations included 
observations of collaborative activities involving members of diverse agencies with 
similar or compatible security goals, in order to identify modes of behavior that indicated 
the kinds of relationships that existed among participants. 
The central issue pursued was the nature of the collaboration and the manner in 
which participants were observed to interact. Using interviews, augmented by 
observations of ongoing operations and examination of official documentary guidance, 
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the study objective was to identify the kinds of interactions intended by the participants, 
the interactions I observed, and the official doctrine that was intended to govern the 
interactions. 
The objective was to assess the kinds of collaborative activities that occur and to 
identify factors that tend to enhance or hinder collaboration. Finally, I interviewed facility 
users, such as commercial operators, regarding perceptions of the people whose safety is 
the purpose of the security operations. The study included evaluative conclusions about 
the manner in which interagency collaboration was taking place, factors that seemed to 
facilitate the collaboration, factors that hinder collaboration, and potential remedies for 
problem areas that have been identified.  
Research Questions 
There were three principal questions addressed in this study. They concerned the 
nature of professional relationships that were intended to be established, the hierarchical 
arrangement of decision authority, the nature and extent of existing working relationships 
in the operating environment, and the manner in which security relationships were to be 
maintained in a way that avoids disruption to the purposes for which the port exists. 
 RQ1: What security-related working relationships exist among all observable 
entities within the research environment? 
RQ2: How have informal working relationships formed and what factors have 
kept them functioning? 
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 RQ3: What kinds of security threats were recognized within the research 
environment and how were they identified and assigned for action? 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework was informed by the work of Schein (2010), who 
described factors affecting development of organizational cultures and the role of 
leadership in forming them. Schein discovered that as organizations coalesce, they 
develop cultures that are unique to them and that these cultures affect the manner in 
which the purposes of the organizations are pursued, the manner in which members 
interact within the organizations, and the effectiveness of the organizations. Schein 
further asserted that a major influence on the development of organizations was the 
action of individual leaders who guide, inform, and motivate members to behave and 
interact in particular manners.  
In the context of this study, Schein (2010) provided concepts that were reflected 
in studies of specific phenomena related to the study environment and the unique 
organizational issues inherent in it. For example, Chalk and Rosenau (2004) described in 
detail the complexities inherent in the tasks of mitigating security threats within the 
United States as compared to similar situations in other democratic countries. The 
principal issue affecting the U.S. security environment much more than that of the other 
countries was the existence of multiple, independent levels of governmental agencies 
with varying security-related tasks. These various agencies have differing jurisdictions, 
many of which overlap: varied priorities, multiple policies and procedures, and disparate, 
15 
 
often conflicting political motivations. The general organizational and leadership 
dynamics described by Schein (2010) provided a sound basis upon which interactions in 
the research environment have been observed and interpreted. Additionally, there are 
multiple skills and capabilities required for maintaining security in dynamic 
environments, especially those involved in international commerce and transportation. 
Johnson (2009) and Dulles (2006) described many of these in detail, and no single 
individual can possess all of them. 
This range of required individual capabilities, combined with the multiple 
agencies in which they exist, makes the task of maintaining security in a large 
transportation hub especially complex. Even so, the fact that the organizations involved 
in security operations at the subject seaport have found ways to cooperate on activities 
that require mutual participation, clarify jurisdictions, and optimize use of resources 
indicated that some sharing of task and talent was likely to be taking place. 
Lisle (2013) presented an argument that the complex interrelationships required 
for effectively combating terrorism necessarily encompassed all stakeholders. This meant 
that everyone from street-level enforcement operatives to tourists on holiday needed to be 
included in the preparations, precautions, and cooperation required to enhance their 
mutual security. Some of these activities were obvious and visible, such as the 
extraordinary measures exercised at embarkation points for screening passengers, 
cargoes, and staff. Others were subtler, but all required some level of participation or at 
least tacit cooperation from many individuals and groups. 
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As such, observation and evaluation of factors affecting coalescence of multiple 
organizations with a common purpose requires recognition of the influence of leaders in 
the presence of events and individual responses to them. It is this combination of factors, 
acting within and among the larger interorganizational issues described above, that 
informed the conceptual framework of this study. 
Nature of the Study 
This was a case study based primarily on interviews with key individuals from the 
various agencies having some responsibility for security of the port. Additionally, 
information was gathered from other individuals who work in commercial or other 
nongovernmental activities. Early interviews helped identify additional candidate 
participants. Selection of participants as well as types of questions asked were informed 
by official documents that influenced or directed interagency operations. 
Other data, such as meeting minutes of interagency committees, newsletter 
articles regarding security operations, or incidents also augmented the interview data and 
such content from security training programs as was available. Concurrently, the study 
design included observations of ongoing security activities to establish norms of 
interaction among individuals and small groups of operatives from the various agencies 
that functioned in the research environment. From this information, a description of the 
kinds of interpersonal dynamics among security personnel was formed. This description 
included interpretations of data that indicated the degree to which personal rather than 
official cooperative protocols operated within the port environment. Secondarily, the data 
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served to help reconstruct the manner in which the cooperative relationships were 
formed. 
Definitions 
Several terms have specific definitions in the context of this study. 
Collaborative public management: A generic term referring to efforts to coalesce 
the resources and capabilities of multiple agencies to collectively pursue common 
purposes. In the context of the present study, it refers to coordination of federal, state, and 
local security agencies. According to Garrett (2010), the expression refers generically to 
any effort to gain synergistic value among multiple agencies and does not follow from 
any single policy. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS): A cabinet-level, federal organization 
with overall responsibility for all aspects of protecting American people and property 
from a wide variety of threats. Several other agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, 
operate under direction of DHS.(presenter, Infrastructure Liaison Officer lecture, 
personal communication, October 10, 2011) 
Infrastructure liaison officer (ILO): A person with responsibility for some aspect 
of facility or personnel security, who is not a member of an official enforcement agency, 
but who has had specific (DHS provided), training for recognizing potential threats, and 
reporting them to appropriate authority. (presenter, Infrastructure Liaison Officer lecture, 
personal communication, October 10, 2011) 
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Intelligence: Information related to the task of maintaining security. It may 
concern potential or actual threats, or may be general data that are of use in the security 
processes. (presenter, Infrastructure Liaison Officer lecture, personal communication, 
October 10, 2011) 
Panga: A type of commercial boat often used by smugglers. Although the name 
refers specifically to a particular manufacturer’s product, Panga has become a generic 
term for any small vessel used for coastal smuggling or other illicit activities. (presenter, 
Infrastructure Liaison Officer lecture, personal communication, October 10, 2011) 
 Tradecraft: A collective term referring to the skills and techniques employed by 
intelligence operatives in the conduct of their work. It generally focuses on acquisition of 
intelligence, but may also include the practice of recruiting other operatives, analyzing 
intelligence, or protecting data or the sources from which it is drawn. (presenter, 
Infrastructure Liaison Officer lecture, personal communication, October 10, 2011) 
 Twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU): A measure of ship cargo, usually associated 
with container ship loads. It refers to an amount of cargo that would fill a standard, 
twenty-foot long cargo container, and is used as a measure of carrying capacity for ships, 
as well as a measure of cargo movement through a seaport. (presenter, Infrastructure 
Liaison Officer lecture, personal communication, October 10, 2011) 
Assumptions 
A key assumption guiding this study was that participants would not feel any 
necessity to provide false or misleading answers to questions because they were assured 
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of confidentiality. The questions  were structured to reinforce this expectation, and the 
participant briefing was designed specifically to assure all participants that their 
anonymity will be carefully protected. Another assumption was that relationships 
between individual actions and governing official policy could be observed during the 
course of their normal working operations, whether these actions were compliant or not. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Although some relevant activities and events occur outside the area of the subject 
port facility, most have been excluded from this study. This decision limited the study to 
the geographical limits of the port and its immediate surroundings. A small number of 
exceptions were made, such as observations and interviews to be conducted in the 
adjacent port because the activities and their effects cannot be practically separated from 
those in the primary area of interest. This exception was applied only to governmental 
organizations. 
 Only those civilian organizations and individuals operating within the primary 
boundaries were included in the research plan. Another delimitation was related to the 
time limit for the research. Because of the limited span time, some relevant activities did 
not occur during the conduct of the study. For example, interorganizational diving 
operations are episodic, occurring only when a mishap or risk occurs. No such events 
occurred during the time of the study, which meant that cooperation among various dive 
teams was not available for observation. Seventeen interviews, lasting 1 to 2 hours each, 
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with observations occurring over approximately 2 months, incidentally excluded 
opportunities for observing some activities that would otherwise have been of interest. 
Limitations 
The study was necessarily limited by the degree to which information could 
properly be provided by the study participants. Even though some extraordinary access 
was promised, there remained some types of data that had to be excluded, either because 
of security classification of the data or because of privacy issues. Allowance for these 
limitations was made in planning the study, and sufficient useful information was still 
available, facilitating assessment and conclusions. 
A further limitation concerned the number and types of organizations that may 
influence the activities under study. Some governmental issues were not accessible for 
the research, including legislative and judicial decisions and rulings that remained beyond 
the control of the participating organizations. The same limitation applied to civilian 
organizations, such as shipping companies or other users of port facilities, that have their 
own policies for maintaining security, some of which were not observable during the 
course of the study. Another limitation is that some of the results may not be 
generalizable to other similar facilities because of conditions that were unique to the 
research environment. It is also true that, as the researcher, I already had some familiarity 
with the environment and with some of the organizations studied, which could be a 
source of bias. To help avoid this, participants were sourced to avoid including any who 
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were already familiar, and I did not have any direct involvement with any of the 
organizations studied (except as they relate to the study itself). 
Significance of the Study 
With threats to U.S. transportation hubs growing in complexity, variety, and 
sophistication, there is a corresponding need for increasingly robust measures to counter 
these threats. These measures must include all relevant domains, ranging from 
international diplomatic focus on threat detection and prevention, to threat intelligence 
gathering and dissemination, to mitigation of vulnerability at the sites where security 
issues may take effect. To fulfill these needs, many kinds of actions and resources will 
have to be applied. 
The focus of this project was on the application of resources at the points where 
security problems may occur (i.e., the subject port and its immediate environs). Within 
that particular domain, the specific interest of the study was narrowed to the manner in 
which existing security resources have been mobilized, coordinated, and directed, as well 
as the ongoing and future efforts of official government agencies to further enhance the 
capabilities and effectiveness of existing and recently added security resources. 
Execution of the research plan revealed some of the recently implemented actions that are 
proving to add value while avoiding disruption or negation of existing security agency 
interactions. 
I have also discovered that some actions have been counterproductive. These 
revelations have provided information that should be useful in guiding future actions 
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associated with increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of security resources at the 
port. Much of this information should prove to be applicable elsewhere, in which case the 
conclusions should prove useful to decision makers at other transportation hubs as a 
source of lessons learned, which could help multiple sites improve the effectiveness of 
applied resources while avoiding pitfalls inherent in making changes to ongoing 
operations.  
The results were made available to managers of the various organizations 
involved in the study for their use in making decisions concerning coordination among 
their own organizations in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Because some 
of the organizations involved work with multiple transportation hubs beyond the research 
environment of this study, there should also be benefit to organizations at other sites. 
Finally, the results of this work should contribute to positive social change by helping 
security personnel recognize the kinds of actions that enhance security while continuing 
to respect the rights of citizens by avoiding disruption to their legitimate activities. 
Should any of the lessons learned in this research project be applied as expected at other 
transportation hubs, this social change benefit will accrue beyond the research 
environment. 
Summary  
The study has been conceived and structured to examine the nature of interagency 
cooperation to maintain security within the research environment. Some longstanding 
relationships are expected to be altered, superseded, or otherwise affected by emerging 
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official policy that are intended to codify and clarify these relationships. The study has 
identified some of the existing relationships, both official and informal, and analyzed the 
transitions into modified and formalized policies and procedures. 
The study has also described the relationships in the context of ongoing 
commercial and recreational activities. Difficulties and conflicts confronting the various 
security personnel were a major focus. As a corollary issue, observations of methods 
employed to mitigate these difficulties and conflicts were also conducted. 
A principal outcome of the study has been a set of observations and analyses of 
practices and techniques that have worked or are reasonably expected to work in helping 
security personnel efficiently and effectively maintain security in the dynamic 
environment of this busy, commercial port. The resultant analyses should prove useful to 
security practitioners within the port environment and may be helpful to practitioners in 
other transportation hubs that face similar demands and challenges. Chapter 2 includes 
the review of the literature, and Chapter 3 includes the research methodology.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Maintenance of physical security in the study seaport is a task that exemplifies the 
larger issue of security in the entire United States. The imperative of protecting lives and 
property from a variety of potential threats while minimizing interference in the ongoing 
functioning of the facilities is a complex, expensive, and unpredictable requirement. The 
purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore issues that can inhibit efficiency of 
security agency operation and collaboration and to identify actions that have enhanced 
collaboration. The objective of these observations and enquiries was to explore the 
perceptions of participants regarding the implementation of interagency collaboration 
protocols. 
This chapter covers the strategy employed to discover the body of literature 
related to the study subject. This included literature related to the types of security issues 
that seaports and other transportation hubs face, theoretical background material related 
to organizational dynamics and factors of leadership, and procedural guidance for 
designing and conducting the study. This has been followed by a discussion of literature 
that informed the conceptual framework.  
As the nature of the problem and the purpose of the study are inseparable from the 
organizational dynamics, selection of the literature for the areas of interest involved 
interrelated material. This interrelationship, in turn, combined with the nature of the 




Three types of literature sources have informed the development of the research 
project: sources related to the security threats affecting the port and the means of 
combating those threats, sources related to the organizational dynamics that operate in the 
research environment, and sources that have guided the selection of the research 
approach and methodology. For information related to the threats to port security, the 
following general categories were applied:  
1. Detection of threats,  
2. Analysis and identification of security threats,  
3. Dissemination of threat data, and  
4. Ethical considerations in security operations. 
For organizational development and dynamics, the principal subjects of interest covered 
were the following:  
1. General organizational development 
2. Interorganizational cooperation 
 The literature related to the study design has focused on the general philosophy of 
research, selection of a research worldview, determination of the most appropriate 
research approach and methodology choice that best suited the nature of the research 
environment, and the opportunities offered for discovering useful information. The 
reasoning behind these literature selections was that the subject of the present study 
involves a complex, public environment, in which multiple security threats potentially 
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operate and in which multiple organizations are needed to work cooperatively to meet 
and mitigate these threats.  
Literature Search Strategy 
The primary source of literature for this study has been the Walden Library, using 
the option of searching for articles by topic. The primary sources within that option have 
been the business and management section, and the policy, administration, and security 
section. Within these sections, some of the key words used pertained to security issues, 
such as security, threat, law enforcement, risk, terrorism, vulnerability, and other related 
words. In addition to these, key words used to find articles on organizational 
development included: leadership, cooperation, coordination, collaboration, 
interagency, interorganization, jurisdiction, and ethics. Principal databases searched were 
ABI/INFORM, SAGE Premier, and ProQuest Central. 
In several cases, references from one article led to selection of additional articles 
if the additional references met the previously established criteria. Some of the selected 
articles also provided key words that informed further searches. In all of these cases, 
additional articles were selected exclusively from the Walden library database or linked 
sources. 
All of these searches were conducted within selected restrictions to ensure that the 
articles would meet desired characteristics for the present purpose. These restrictions 
included articles published within 5 years of the original search, availability of full-text 
copies, and selection exclusively from peer-reviewed journals. Several of the referenced 
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books were found in my local public library or from my personal home library. In the 
latter case, most of the books were purchased in connection with previous Walden course 
work. In general, the books concern organizational dynamics or issues related to security 
and threat mitigation. 
Conceptual Framework  
Schein (2010) provided the general framework for the study in the form of a 
model of organizational culture development. This book was selected for two principal 
reasons: (a) it had already served as a text and reference book for previous Walden course 
work, and (b) it offered a description and justification for modeling organizational culture 
that fit the intention of the proposed research project. The conceptual framework, based 
on the three levels of culture and further described in the explanations of macrocultures, 
subcultures, and microcultures, established a set of observational models within which 
observations could be described and categorized. These models provided a standard set of 
descriptions for behaviors and events within the research environment, which served as a 
basis for comparison as well as a means of maintaining consistency in recording 
observations and interpreting results. 
Another contribution of Schein’s (2010) work was the description of the role of 
leadership and the exposition of various manners in which it may function within 
organizations. Leadership was seen to be a key factor both in establishing cultural norms 
and in gaining acceptance of them among members of cultural groups. Although 
sometimes difficult to directly observe, Schein asserted that leadership was detectable 
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through its effects on organizational functioning and the interaction of a group’s 
members. 
In addition to the Schein’s (2010) models, the literature search also revealed 
research reports that, while conducted in different environments with different objectives 
from the study reported in this dissertation, nevertheless offered some methodological 
examples and corroboration of the Schein’s models. For example, Solansky and Beck 
(2009) found that interorganizational cultures that developed shared acknowledgement of 
the importance of collaboration among organizations was associated with increased 
effectiveness and shortened response times in addressing threats. This shared 
acknowledgement or belief was seen to manifest itself in stated and professed 
commitment to collaboration. That commitment, as described in Solansky and Beck’s 
paper, was consistent with the second level of culture, as described in Schein’s book. 
A negative but useful example of research that can be related to Schein (2010) 
was the Garrett (2010) study, which found that failures of large, interagency 
organizations to develop shared acknowledgement of the need for collaboration resulted 
in substantial inertia and general dysfunction in the larger organization. Garrett’s 
descriptions of these problems were comparable to the understood, tacit sorts of belief (or 
lack thereof) described in the third cultural level described by Schein. The specific 
observations that led to the conclusion that this underlying assumption was lacking were 




In the Garrett (2010) case, the observed behaviors were seen to be both symptoms 
and results of the failure of organizational leadership to foster the kinds of cultural 
development necessary for effective functioning of interagency organizations. The 
leadership failures were examples of the type described theoretically in Schein’s (2010) 
book. Finally, Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) found that existing organizational cultural 
norms, which were described in a manner that was consistent with the Schein’s model, 
increased the likelihood that multilevel and multiagency organizations would coalesce 
successfully to make efficient use of available resources. In general, the current research 
collected for this study tended to indicate that the organizational culture models provided 
by Schein (2010) would serve effectively as a conceptual framework for the entire 
research project. 
Literature Review 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, three domains of literature informed 
the plan for this study. Of these, the nature of the threat and means of countering it have 
been treated in the section entitled Types and Sources of Threats. Although some 
understanding of the security issues that comprise the work I observed was necessary for 
interpreting these observations, this domain did not directly influence the selection of a 
theoretical concept or methodological approach. Those choices informed by literature 
directly related to them. Thus, the following sections treat the subjects of research design 
and theoretical concept specifically, and the literature review was conducted with the 
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intention of identifying and subsequently justifying the selection of supporting 
organizational theories and methodological approach. 
Types and Sources of Threats 
Lutz, Roell, and Thiele (2013) delineated the types of threats that challenge 
security agencies in their efforts to maintain security of seaports. These threats, in 
general, fell into five types: (a) piracy and armed robbery, (b) maritime terrorism, (c) 
illicit trafficking, (including narcotics, weapons, human beings, and other contraband), 
(d) sabotage, and (e) cargo theft. Sources of these threats may be traditional and irregular 
warfare, terrorist organizations, and organized crime, in a constantly evolving and 
unpredictably interconnected mix. Lutz et al. (2013) further explained that the domain of 
maritime security encompasses more than just unimpeded conduct of maritime 
commerce, but also includes preservation of free access to the seas for all legitimate 
purposes as well as maintaining good governance of seaways to enhance operational 
safety and efficiency. 
To provide this security, Lutz et al. (2013) prescribed a combination of both 
preventive and responsive measures, applied in a cooperative and systematic functioning 
environment. Cooperation and use of systematic protocols were identified as especially 
important because the means and causes of security threats generally cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. Attackers may travel by sea on their way to their intended points of action, or 
they may target port facilities specifically. Alternatively, they may attempt to use port 
facilities as bases of operation for attacks on ships at sea or inland targets, or they may 
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merely pose credible threats of any combination of these as a means of disrupting 
commerce or the general functioning of society. 
Among the categories of action that required interorganizational cooperation, Lutz 
et al. (2103) named the following: 
• inspecting vessels, terminals, and other facilities;  
• responding to crises involving threats of terrorism or actual attacks;  
• monitoring and controlling access to facilities and vessels;  
• interviewing, examining, and credentialing transportation workers and facility 
personnel;  
• conducting surveillance operations and participating in undercover assignments;  
• tracking and interdicting suspicious cargo, persons, vessels, or vehicles;  
• recognizing and detecting the presence of bombs, explosives, and weapons of 
mass destruction;  
• interacting on security matters with vessel security officers, company security 
officers, facility security officers, and relevant federal, state, and local agencies; 
and 
• performing threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments; security planning; and 
contingency planning.  
Although Lutz et al. (2013) acknowledged that existing protocols were not yet 
adequate to accomplish these actions in a fully cooperative manner, they did observe that 
general agreements concerning the need for cooperation had been reached among many 
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nations and jurisdictions. This indicated that progress toward further cooperation may be 
expected. They did not, however, offer examples or descriptions of the ongoing efforts, 
nor did they identify specific areas of cooperation that remain to be addressed. 
This lack was partially filled by Sandoz (2012), who also noted a lack of adequate 
cooperative protocols for maintaining security. In addition to the provision of active 
security measures among agencies, Sandoz (2012) indicated that general governance 
processes were needed. The absence of sound maritime governance was seen as a 
significant vulnerability that could be exploited by state or nonstate actors to disrupt, 
usurp, or block legitimate activities at sea and ashore. Sandoz (2012) concluded that 
individual jurisdictional entities such as nations or other political divisions should devise 
and announce their own protocols but should do so in consultation with other interested 
parties, including other nations. In this way, the entity responsible for maintaining and 
executing the policies and activities retains the right to determine what they are, while 
assuring other stakeholders that the policies will be compatible with the interests of all 
concerned.  
Although useful and relevant to the present purpose, neither Lutz et al. (2013) nor 
Sandoz (2012) addressed the increasing dependence of transportation hubs on vulnerable 
electronic communication and data storage media. This more recent but significant issue 
regarding maritime security is cybersecurity. Kramek (2013) found that cybersecurity had 
received inadequate attention in most U.S. port facilities. According to this report, 
protecting data from unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction constituted a major 
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vulnerability, and although recognized as an issue, has not received the allocation of 
resources or higher authority needed to establish a program of strengthening defenses 
against cyberthreats. 
Kramek (2013) asserted that port facilities rely as much on networked computer 
and control systems as they do on waterfront workers. Even so, the study found that no 
common standards for cybersecurity has been promulgated nor has authority over 
cybersecurity been granted to the agencies that are normally responsible for general port 
security, most notably, the U.S. Coast Guard. Furthermore, the study found that basic 
cybersecurity methods were not being practiced with sufficient diligence to prevent even 
relatively unsophisticated attacks. The consequences of failure to prevent major 
disruptions of computer and control systems would have an immediate and substantial 
effect on the U.S. economy by disrupting the flow of goods through the facilities, both for 
imports and exports.  
To address these vulnerabilities, Kramek (2013) recommended several specific 
actions by Congress, various security authorities, and port operators. Some of these 
recommendations could be implemented immediately, while others would require many 
months and perhaps years to accomplish. Each increment of action on the issue was seen 
as contributing sufficiently to justify its implementation, even as others were still 
pending. Collectively, Kramek (2013) asserted that the recommended actions would 
greatly increase protections against cyberattacks while simultaneously producing 
disincentives for anyone who might attempt to commit them. 
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Threat Detection, Assessment, and Data Dissemination 
Sims and Gerber (2005) provided a compendium of expert opinions that explored 
the field of security intelligence, counterintelligence, threat assessment/analysis, and 
communication of security data among cooperating agencies. From this comprehensive 
overview, it was evident that the critical issues involved in gathering and using security 
information are profoundly complex. Processes for gathering of information involve 
substantial degrees of vertical and horizontal communication because some entities with 
access to sources may not be aware of the need to exercise that access. Conversely, 
entities with clear understanding of threats may not know that some other cooperating 
entities have the ability to collect relevant data. According to Chalk and Rosenau (2004), 
this kind of difficulty is especially confounding for U.S. security entities because U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies are much more disparate and separated by 
jurisdictional boundaries than are their counterparts in other Western countries. 
For these reasons, establishment of reliable means for sharing information among 
agencies is difficult but necessary. Agencies that report at the federal level tend to have 
the most extensive resources for collecting general threat data and for comparing large 
masses of data in a way that permits the extraction of meaningful conclusions. These 
agencies, however, are limited in several ways. First, they each have specialty areas in 
which they are required to operate. Generally, these specialty areas confine them to 




Secondly, the allocation of resources limits all agencies, forcing them to prioritize 
their operations. These priorities may not be compatible with priorities of other agencies. 
Finally, the selection of specific activities must rely largely on the professional judgment 
of senior members of each organization. Regardless of the degree of professional 
competence, these judgments are dependent upon the quality of the information available 
to support them. Because all agencies must rely on at least some data from other 
agencies, thorough and efficient coordination is imperative (Garrett, 2010).  
Even while members of most agencies recognize this necessity, there remain 
many structural and procedural impediments to full and efficient sharing of data. 
Chappell and Gibson (2009) investigated one of the most widespread of these 
impediments, in the case of community policing. Chappell and Gibson (2009) discovered 
that there was broad disagreement on the issue of compatibility of community policing 
and the centralized, federalized operation of homeland security operations. While some 
local police officials believed that community policing and homeland security processes 
were complementary, many others felt that the two approaches were in conflict, and that 
attempts to conduct both in the same environment were counterproductive. 
In the specific case of the subject seaport, this issue was identified as one of the 
key factors of interest. This is because there has been a long-standing emphasis on 
community policing among some of the agencies involved, while there has also been a 
strong federal presence in some areas of the study environment. Focus on this existing 
condition provided a useful paradigm for the larger questions about cooperation among 
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multiple participating security agencies, all having disparate roles, cultures, and 
organizational procedures. 
This phenomenon was further explored by Lisle (2013), who described the 
dynamics of breakdown of communication, and thus, cooperation, among stakeholders in 
the process of maintaining security. This issue was seen as being especially acute in cases 
where the actual nature of the activity to be protected had to be modified as part of the 
security provision. When this kind of issue arose, there was the potential for significant 
conflict between the protectors and those protected by them. Lisle’s findings underscored 
the importance of examining and describing the dynamics of the many interactions that 
had to occur in threatened environments, in order to manage the interactions in a way that 
prevented misunderstandings and conflicts. 
Giblin, Schafer, and Burruss (2009) found that there was an apparent causal 
relationship between perception of risk among security agency personnel and their 
willingness to undertake preparatory and preventative actions. Also, there was a causal 
relationship between the number of preparatory measures taken and the confidence of the 
individuals in their ability to cope with potentially harmful events. When combined with 
Lisle’s (2013) findings about interactions among interested groups, and Giblin and 
colleagues’ findings about factors affecting willingness to prepare, and confidence in the 
efficacy of preparations, there was useful guidance for inquiry into the current attitudes 




Another potential difficulty concerned individual talents and capabilities that 
cannot be separated from specific job requirements. Johnson (2009) described some of 
the characteristics that are required for individuals conducting specific kinds of security 
related jobs. Some of the combinations of traits may prove to be rare, which require 
recruiters, managers, and administrators to accept compromises, in order to optimize, 
rather than maximize the desired characteristics of selected individuals. In such cases, 
there exists the potential for conflicts between these specially selected individuals and 
their peers in terms of internal relationships during normal, ongoing security operations. 
This dynamic adds to the complexity of maintaining effective coordination among 
operatives. 
Dulles (2006) asserted that, while there are formal training facilities and programs 
for some types of security personnel, there are few, if any, that have proven to be 
universally appropriate for intelligence-gathering specialists. This is because the activities 
required for intelligence collection can be widely varied, and are generally more 
dependent on individual personality traits than on any specific skill set, “because [the 
operative’s] abilities in the craft itself are more important than any specialized topical or 
area knowledge” (p. 174). This ambiguity is important, not only for the individual 
intelligence operative, but also for those with responsibility for selecting and assigning 
operatives. It constitutes another challenge in the general field of security work. 
The issue of requisite skills is not confined to security personnel. Lack of skill and 
an attendant lack of adequate income are also seen as potential sources of security 
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problems. Belzer and Swan (2012) addressed this issue, describing the growing threat to 
the global supply chain, and, by extension, to the security of port facilities, that result 
from the growing use of low-paid, minimally-qualified, and inadequately screened and 
monitored transport workers. This kind of issue not only creates a special vulnerability 
for the transport industry, but also invokes the fundamental conflict between efficient and 
economical transportation activities and the kinds of security measures necessary to 
protect them from criminal and terrorist threats. 
Belzer and Swan (2012) described the conflict as being one for which decision 
makers need to be aware that apparent expedients, especially those involving the 
minimization of costs such as payroll, may not always maintain an optimally efficient and 
profitable operation. Low-paid and low skilled personnel, who often have independent 
custody of transport containers, are found to be vulnerable to a variety of incentives and 
coercion from criminal or terrorist operatives. Visible cost savings may seem to be 
advisable from a profit-driven decision process. “In high risk-situations, however, widely 
dispersed compensation associated with market-driven pay may be associated with 
undesirable and inefficient outcomes” (Belzer & Swan, 2012, p. 41). The difficulty of 
coping with this reality is that the immediate cost is readily apparent to managers and 
their accountants, while the risk cost is both uncertain and difficult to quantify. Because 
of this difficulty, the burden placed upon security agencies is increased, due to the 
unwillingness of transportation managers to expend the resources necessary to mitigate 
some risk factors at the source. This fact tends to increase the opportunity for threats to 
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be introduced at the departure end of the transportation chain, which increases the 
likelihood that threats will be undetected at the receiving end. For purposes of the subject 
of this report, this factor was deemed to be potentially significant for the study 
participants and the security duties they were expected to perform. 
International Cooperation 
Nau (1995) argued that strategic security policy requires extensive international 
cooperation, and must involve such issues as trade practices, as well as intelligence and 
mutual security enforcement activities. This kind of necessity further complicates the task 
of security agency coordination, because it involves political policies that may often be at 
odds with the most expedient and reliable security processes. Nevertheless, the need for 
inclusion of trade issues in the complex equations of security cannot be ignored.  This is 
not only true because of the need to maintain international trust and cooperation, but also 
because many of the threats to security have for their main purpose the disruption of 
international trade. Thus, international negotiations for trade policy will often include 
negotiations regarding cooperation in the realm of mutual security. Although this is 
primarily a policy issue that is beyond the scope of the current purpose, it does add to the 
complexity of the task, and awareness of this factor may influence some of the 
interactions among local organizations that have differing international interfaces and 
differing priorities regarding accommodation of non-United States entities. 
This is also a potential area of discussion for the kinds of issues examined by 
Belzer and Swan (2012). If individual shippers are found to be reluctant to take 
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mitigating steps, due to real or imagined competitive pressures, perhaps host countries 
may be convinced that it is in their best interest to impose broadly applied standards of 
employee training and screening. Until this is done, however, the risk remains focused 
largely on the destination environment and the security agencies responsible for it.  
Elements of Tradecraft 
The processes for gathering information are both driven and delimited by all of 
the above considerations. Tradecraft, or the techniques and methods of intelligence 
operations, is dependent upon many factors: (a) technology, (b) policy, (c) politics, (d) 
resources, and (e) externally-imposed conditions. All of these factors remain in play 
during the information gathering process, and must be understood and considered.  
Technology of Tradecraft 
The technology of tradecraft is arguably the most independent of the factors. As 
new technological capabilities become available, they may generally be evaluated and 
selected according to their potential for enhancing operations. For this factor, the primary 
consideration is availability of sufficient budgetary resources to acquire and deploy new 
technologies. 
The actual use of technologies, even when such use is both feasible and desirable 
from a purely operational point of view, may be, and often is, restricted by policy. For 
many reasons, security policy may limit the use, or even the acquisition of new 
technological capabilities. At the organizational level, policy is the immediate control 
element related to the technology of tradecraft. Policies may be influenced by such 
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factors as interagency jurisdictional boundaries, a desire to avoid redundancy or 
excessive dependence on particular technologies, or perhaps even the philosophical 
preferences of policy makers. Most often, though, policy is driven by politics. 
Tradecraft Policy, Politics, and Resources 
Dulles (2006) described some of the complexities of disseminating intelligence 
data and analysis to the policymaking authorities that need it to support security 
decisions. Timeliness and accuracy are, of course, of paramount importance, but there is 
also a multitude of other considerations. Some considerations relate to the analysis itself, 
such as the juxtaposition of timeliness and accuracy. 
In order to be useful to the consumers of intelligence, it must be interpreted in a 
way that it can be related to the policy decisions that may be influenced by it. The 
interpretations must provide relevant data in a form that can be understood by policy-
makers who may not be able to comprehend it in an unrefined form. Such processing of 
data necessarily takes time. The task of the intelligence team becomes one of determining 
a deadline for delivering the information in time to be useful, while allowing sufficient 
time to ensure the accuracy and comprehensibility of the intelligence report. 
Johnson (2009) provided explanations of relationships between policy, and the 
means of executing policies. In general, policy provides the governing guidance that 
defines the goals and intentions of the intelligence work. As such, it becomes the task of 
practitioners to establish strategic frameworks through which the policies are to be 
carried out, and to implement tactics that will actually accomplish the work. 
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Throughout the entire process of intelligence gathering, analyses, and 
dissemination, there are guiding values that must be honored. In essence, the values 
constitute the ethical framework of intelligence tradecraft. Failure to adhere to the ethical 
values can have many negative effects (Olson, 2006). Even when common values are 
shared and upheld among multiple agencies, there can still be conflicts, due to differences 
in specific agency interpretations, or the effects of higher-level authorities of various 
jurisdictions imposing specific rules and procedures.  
External Influences on Tradecraft 
Much of the intelligence activity must necessarily take place outside the United 
States. This requirement imposes a variety of restrictions on both the nature of the 
activities used to gather intelligence, and the quality of the resultant information. For 
example, it may be difficult, due to host country restrictions, to establish independent 
sources of information that do not have to pass their reports through some official 
government source.  
In addition, it may be difficult to accurately assess the real value of an 
information source, as in a case cited by Johnson (2009) in which a volunteer source, 
who seemed to be well placed, was eventually found to be completely unreliable. Initially 
trusted, the source was later recognized as more hindrance than help, whose information 
was either irrelevant or deemed to be false. Although developing corroborative sources 
can help to avoid this kind of difficulty, such sources can often be impossible to identify, 
or dangerous to employ. Another external dynamic that can negatively influence the 
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effectiveness of intelligence work, is the kind of incompatible norms of participating 
agencies that have formed one of the issues for this study. Although outside the scope of 
the present work, the findings from the current study may eventually prove to be of some 
use to practitioners who must cope with interagency issues in external environments. 
Ethical Considerations 
Domestic factors, too, may influence the practice of tradecraft. Some potentially 
valuable sources of information may have conflicts with ethical practices in their own 
professional fields. For example, the use of journalists as information sources, even in 
critical situations, can have severely negative results. For this reason, intelligence 
gathering activities enlist the cooperation of individuals outside the security community 
must be done judiciously (Olson, 2006). 
The level at which tradecraft is practiced may also have an influence on the 
manner of its execution. The very existence of multiple levels of operation may generate 
decisions that would not have been made in isolation, particularly in situations where 
various rules of behavior conflict. For example, U.S. federal activism on security issues 
within local or regional jurisdictions may motivate the lower level officials to enact 
policy decisions that are designed to prevent what they feel is federal interference in their 
domains. 
Woods and Bowman (2011) observed this phenomenon at various levels, 
especially when multiple regional authorities perceived federal intrusion. It was not only 
extant federal actions, but also those that were anticipated that were seen to motivate state 
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behavior. This was a source of mistrust and friction between municipal authorities and 
those above them in the hierarchy. 
Organizational Theory 
As stated earlier, Schein (2010) provided the principal guidance for building a 
theoretical framework for the study. Within the constructs offered by Schein, the 
proposed research will involve conducting interviews and observations in a manner 
consistent with the models previously described. The models employ reliance on existing 
researcher knowledge of the subject and research environment, and consist of face-to-
face interviews that are guided by a standard interview questionnaire and format. These 
interviews were augmented by observations of ongoing security related activity in the 
research environment. In this way, consistency of the data collection processes has been 
enhanced, and the framework provided a convenient means of organizing the information 
as it was collected. The use of these models has also helped systematize the organization 
of the body of data, so that crosschecking and cross-referencing of participant responses 
and researcher observations was easily accomplished. This, in turn, helped to strengthen 
the credibility and dependability of the data. 
The applicability of the theoretical models to the present purpose has been 
supported by use of current research works, which have either employed or observed the 
principles provided by Schein (2010). The reports by Solansky and Beck (2009), Garrett 
(2010), and Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) each provided useful corroboration for the 
Schein models, in a context that was found to be applicable to this study. With the 
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theoretical models thus supported by current research, Schein’s model has proved to be a 
sound foundation for conduct of the project. 
Guidance for Research Design and Execution 
Despite the large body of literature available about a variety of security topics, my 
search for specific data about the transition from collegial, ad hoc cooperation among 
members of agencies, to a more formalized, top down structure for interface protocols 
has yielded little useful information. In fact, there are indications that some researchers, 
such as Eriksson and Rhinard (2009), as previously noted, have concluded that much 
more investigation is needed to determine the state of such transitions and the problems 
associated with trying to accomplish them. This tends to corroborate my early 
impression, gained from preliminary study of the research environment, that the nature of 
the process of transition and its inherent risks and difficulties are not well understood. 
As a guide for selection of a research approach and methodological design, this 
lack of understanding favored a qualitative approach, using a case study methodology. 
This type of reasoning was provided by Trochim (2001), who asserted that a qualitative 
study may help not only to gain insights into the nature of the environment and 
phenomena of interest, but also to help develop new conceptualizations of issues that 
have not previously been proposed. “This is where most of the more interesting and 
valuable new theories and hypotheses originate” (Trochim, 2001, p. 152). 
Martella, Nelson, and Marchand (1999) recommended that case study research be 
used when issues and phenomena of interest cannot be practically defined in advance. 
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Case study research was seen to allow the researcher to explore the research environment 
and research subjects, in order to identify issues and phenomena, and to modify the 
specific focus of the study while it was in progress. By such processes, the researcher 
could gain additional insights into research participants, and the environments in which 
they operated, in greater depth than originally anticipated.  
With the foregoing indications favoring a case study, it followed that an 
appropriate case study design should be accomplished. This required consideration of the 
general nature of the study environment, identity and capabilities of the researcher, 
boundaries of the study, including geographical, organizational, personal, and temporal 
limitations, and availability of background information that could be used in preparation 
of the design, as well as evaluation of the findings. The principal source of guidance for 
the design was Yin’s (2009) study. 
Yin (2009) described the case study process as, “a linear but iterative process” (p. 
4). Appropriate for a study in which an in depth and detailed description of a 
phenomenon (or phenomena) is desired, a case study was prescribed for explaining the 
how and why questions regarding the topic(s) of interest. Instructions for designing a case 
study began with the process of defining the units of analysis, followed by explanations 
of the general theoretical orientation of the study, and the propositions or issues to be 
studied. These descriptions would then inform decisions about the procedures to be 




Yin (2009) also suggested using the design criteria to establish the metrics for 
measuring quality of the findings and conclusions, and for establishing the case study 
protocol. To comply with this suggestion, the design criteria that govern acquisition of 
information about participant perceptions have also been applied to the establishment of 
success criteria. That is, if the interviews yield sufficient data to provide for a comparison 
of official guidance with actual practice, that portion of the study may be considered 
successful. Likewise, if observations of activities in the research environment yield 
sufficient data to make meaningful comparisons of observed activities to official doctrine, 
this too may be considered a successful outcome. 
Further guidance for developing the study was provided by Stake (1995). Some of 
this guidance related to the interpretive nature of case study research. Interpretation, 
according to Stake, should be part of the planning process, because some interpretation 
necessarily occurs during the course of the study, while other interpretation is done after 
observations and other data gathering activities have been completed. 
As with the quality metric process discussed above, interpretations have also been 
accommodated, in the sense that allowance has been made in the research design for 
before-and-after interpretations of phenomena in the research environment to be 
compared. In this way, interpretations themselves will have been subjected to internal 
quality checks. If a pre study interpretation of some phenomenon was found to be 
substantially different from its post-study counterpart, the assumptions that led to study 
elements, such as interview questions, may be reviewed for possible reinterpretation. This 
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process has also been accommodated for observations of activities and examination of 
official documentation.  
Summary and Conclusions 
As expected, the body of literature available provided background, guidance, and 
indications of need for the present study. The subject of security threats has received 
considerable attention, including descriptions of the nature and types of threats, means of 
combating the threats, and the implications of conducting security operations in a 
dynamic commercial and social environment. Organizational dynamics has been the 
subject of extensive study for generations, and the literature has continued to be 
reexamined and updated, so that the main task in planning the current study was to select 
the most suitable publications from the large body of available data. Likewise, research 
design has drawn the attention of numerous professional researchers who have written 
extensively on the subject. As with organizational dynamics, the main task has been to 
apply the recommendations that promised to be most appropriate for the present purpose. 
Chapter 3 includes a detailed description of the research methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
This chapter begins with a description of the selected research methodology, and 
an explanation for making this selection, rather than some other method. This is followed 
by a description of the role of the researcher, detailed description of research procedures 
and research questions to be addressed. Finally, the chapter contains information about 
various issues related to trustworthiness in the research, including procedures to enhance 
trustworthiness. The chapter concludes with a summary. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The decision as to whether to use a quantitative or qualitative approach was 
relatively unequivocal. Trochim (2001) described the conditions and procedures required 
to conduct a quantitative study, whether observational or experimental. Both conditions 
required that the research environment and research questions were permissive of 
sufficient bounding of variables and collection of exclusive data to yield results that 
could be analyzed quantitatively. These conditions could not be met in the research 
environment, because sufficient controls on data generation could not be maintained. 
This same limitation also prevented the use of the quantitative measurement necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of a mixed method study, thus neither quantitative nor mixed 
methods was selected. 
Conversely, observational opportunities for identifying activities and relating 
them to individual participants and groups were established. This met the general set of 
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conditions necessary for a qualitative study (Trochim, 2001). With this determination, it 
was necessary to select the most appropriate design for a qualitative study. 
One of the candidate designs considered was ethnography. While perhaps 
feasible, in terms of observational opportunities, ethnographic studies require the 
researcher to develop descriptions of a particular culture within the research environment. 
In fact, multiple cultures were considered likely to be in operation, but were not relevant 
to the purpose of the research. The same could be said of phenomenology. While perhaps 
interesting, specific perceptions of participants would be difficult and time-consuming to 
determine, and would probably not yield data about the operational relationships among 
participants in their professional activities. 
Grounded theory offered some promise, and was considered. In this type of 
design, it would have been necessary to develop a theoretical explanation of the observed 
behavior of participants. This theory would then have been iteratively modified through 
further observation. The negative factor involved in this type of approach was that the 
theory itself would have necessitated certain limits on the observational process. Because 
the research opportunity available for this study was to interview and observe, in order to 
derive conclusions, and not to gather data for theory formation, grounded theory was 
rejected.  
Given that the purpose of this study was to observe, inquire, and examine the 
activities of security agency personnel, and to discover factors that are associated with 
collaboration within the study environment, a research design that facilitated those 
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pursuits was determined to be needed. Considering the characteristics of the research 
environment, the focus of the research, and the open-ended nature of the issues that were 
explored, a case study methodology emerged as the most appropriate. This determination 
was reinforced by Creswell (2007), who advocated use of case study methodology for 
studies to be conducted within bounded systems, such as a specific setting or context. 
Further support for the selection was provided by Yin (2009). The complexities of the 
interactions and interventions were greater than could be reasonably explored through use 
of other methods, such as surveys or experiments, and a key intention was to describe and 
illustrate the phenomena of interest (Yin, 2009). 
This type of design has also been reinforced in that it allowed for my chosen role 
as observer-interviewer. Having worked in the research environment in the past, in a 
variety of assignments, I have sufficient understanding of the environment to allow for 
thorough identification and examination of all relevant areas of the environment. The 
dynamic nature of the research environment also favored a case study, due to the 
increasing complexity and volume of operations in the port. The increasing number and 
variety of criminal and terrorist adversaries continue to exercise ever-greater ingenuity in 
finding ways to defeat existing security measures. At the same time, the various agencies 
holding jurisdiction over multiple aspects of port security continue to evolve, as threats, 
political pressures, and opportunities for growth and improvement increase. These 
characteristics complicated the process of preplanning, and required that the research 
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process have sufficient flexibility to allow for modifications that result from 
interpretation of some data as it is revealed. 
One of the key strengths of case study research is that it allows for this concurrent 
data collection and interpretation (Stake, 1995). Creswell (2009) offered a similar 
justification for a case study, in describing the task as being intensively focused on an 
individual or context: “A case study is an intensive study of a specific individual or 
specific context” (p. 161). Given the dynamic nature of the research environment, and the 
fact that the intention was to intensively study that environment (context), a case study 
emerged as the most appropriate choice.  
Role of the Researcher 
My role as researcher was as an observer interviewer. My knowledge of the 
research environment derived from past experience in the environment, as a customer of 
some of the facilities therein. Although my past role has not been directly involved with 
security, I am familiar with the general issues and processes for maintaining it. 
In addition, having worked in the environment, and with some of the participants, 
I have been able to gain the trust of those and others to whom I have been referred. My 
former role in the environment affords me some credibility with the participants, and I 
assured them that their identities would be held in strictest confidence. Through these 
assurances, and through the recommendations of selected acquaintances, I was able to 
recruit the participants needed for the study. 
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Even though my former work has not involved security, the fact of having 
witnessed, and occasionally participated in activities required by security concerns, 
should be recognized as a potential source of bias. To alleviate this, I have structured the 
questions, and the mode of displaying responses, so that readers of my report will have 
the information necessary to make their own interpretations, and to compare my 
interpretations with their own. This, of course, does not necessarily eliminate potential 
bias in selection of questions, or decisions to follow up on responses, but, by thoroughly 
describing the process, as executed, I believe that any bias may be either discounted, or 
allowed for by other assessors of my results. 
Another check on potential bias is the offer by one individual to serve as an 
informal peer reviewer. This individual, who is thoroughly familiar with the research 
environment, as well as the issues under study, has reviewed my data, as well as my 
conclusions, to offer observations that may weaken my findings. Through this review I 
believe that my findings have been strengthened, by identifying and eliminating any 
fallacies. Because my interest is merely exposition of organizational development issues, 
with a goal of offering information that may help in the continuing development of a 
complex and dynamic organization, in which I am not a current or intended participant, I 
do not believe any meaningful conflict of interests have been created by this study.  
Methodology 
This has been a case study, focusing primarily on members of various 
organizations with responsibility for security in and around the subject seaport. Most data 
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have been collected through interviews, combined with observations of activities of some 
of the participants in the routine course of their work, which were augmented with 
examination of relevant, public domain documents that contained information about 
officially-promulgated policies and procedures to be followed by the subject 
organizations. In general, the procedures and techniques proposed by Stake (1995) have 
served as the guide for conducting the study, with additional guidance taken from 
Creswell (2007) and Yin (2009). 
As suggested in these and other references, it was expected that the initial study 
plan would undergo modification during the course of the study, as new information, and 
perhaps additional participants were identified. This, in fact, proved to be the case, in that 
saturation of significant data obviated the need to interview the entire group of 
participants in the original plan. Descriptions, analyses, and conclusions are qualitative in 
nature, except that some quantitative analyses of groups of qualitative data proved to be 
substantive. For this reason, appropriate quantitative analytical techniques were 
employed. Although quantitative data inclusion was not directly anticipated in planning 
this study, the flexibility of the case study methodology permitted the use of quantitative 
analytical techniques, the results of which have been discussed in Chapter 4. 
Participant Selection 
As recommended by Creswell (2007), a purposeful sample strategy was used, 
selecting participants from a total population of approximately 400 individuals. Working 
from organization rosters, individuals were assigned sequential numbers, and participants 
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were selected on a random basis. This was accomplished by using a random number table 
to select sequence numbers, with the participants selected according to the random 
selection of their preassigned sequence number. The number of total participants from 
each organization was determined by the ratio of total number of members in the 
organization, relative to the numbers of members in other participating organizations. In 
this way, the purposeful nature of the sample was maintained, because each organization 
had at least some members selected for participation. Thus, the sample was held to a 
manageable size, while still providing a selected cross section of the total population. 
This allowed for in depth interviews, which yielded the desired level of relevance and 
detail (Yin, 2009). 
Finally, although the possibility that some additional participants may be needed 
to help provide background information related to official documentation or other data 
related to the context of the research environment, this allowance in process proved to be 
unnecessary. All desired data was obtained through the planned interview and 
observation processes.  
As indicated above, the intention was to include some participants from each of 
the large organizational groups. Essentially, this included law enforcement organizations 
from federal, state, and local authorities, military organizations with regular participation 
in some aspect of port security, and security personnel from nongovernmental 
(commercial) entities. This type of division yielded an allocation (out of 20 participants 
total) of four federal law enforcement personnel, two state personnel, ten local, two 
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military, and two commercial. It was considered possible that during the progress of the 
interviews, the resultant data might reach a point of saturation, with the preponderance of 
responses converging on similar views by the participants. This proved to be the case, 
which resulted in a reduction of interviews from the planned total of twenty, to the lesser 
number of seventeen. Even so, the planned allocation was sufficient to preserve the 
purposeful nature of the sample, while permitting random selection within the total 
population. It also allocated interviews to approximately 5% of the population of each 
agency, including U.S. Coast Guard personnel, U.S. Department of Justice officers, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security personnel, State Police, Port Police, City Police, U.S. 
Navy, and local commercial transportation or warehousing personnel. 
Instrumentation 
 The principal data collection instrument was an open-ended interview guide, 
using the interview questions listed in the Appendix. I developed the instrument in 
accordance with guidance provided by Creswell (2007) and Yin (2009). Other collection 
instruments were allowed for in the study plan, but proved to be unnecessary. The single 
exception consisted of my notes based on interviews, observations, general impressions 
of the research environment, and studies of published public data sources, to be used as 
explanatory or augmentative information related to observed activity in the research 
environment. As explained by Creswell (2007), interviewer experience with both the 
subject matter of the interview and the process of interviewing can have a profound effect 
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on the quality of the outcome, and in this instance, my previous experience with the 
research environment proved to be helpful.  
Because the official documentation anticipated for use will be selected on the 
basis of its relevance to issues being studied, its accuracy is verified by definition. The 
principal interview instrument, and the questions contained within it, has been drawn 
directly from the research questions, which are at the core of this study. For this reason, it 
seemed reasonable to assert that the instrument is both appropriate and sufficient for the 
purpose.  
Interview Questions. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. The research 
questions, and the related questionnaire questions, are: 
RQ1: What security-related working relationships exist among all observable 
entities within the research environment? 
• What is the role of your organization in the Port? 
 
• How does your organization share security responsibility with other 
organizations? 
• What other organizations do you interface with? 
 
• How are decisions regarding security operations made between your organization 
and others? 




• What kinds of informal working relationships have you formed with members of 
your own organization? 
• How did these relationships develop? 
• What kinds of informal working relationships do you have with members of other 
organizations? 
• How did these relationships develop? 
• Tell me about any problems between the informal working relationships and the 
official direction that governs your work. 
RQ3: What kinds of security threats are recognized within the research 
environment and how are they identified and assigned for action? 
• Describe the security threats you know about that could affect the port. 
• Among these, which ones are you involved in mitigating? 
• How is your involvement defined and assigned to you? 
• How secure do you feel in your working environment? 
• What factors contribute to your personal feelings about security? 
• What, if any, security threats do you think should be added to your assigned 
duties? 
• If there are additional threats, why should you be involved with them, and what 
would be your role in mitigating them? 
The last two questions were informed by Giblin and colleagues’ (2009) and 
Lisle’s (2013) studies, which helped define the need for information about factors that 
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influence perceptions of the quality of cooperative activities and the sources of 
confidence in collective preparations and preventative actions. With these general types 
of questions in mind, any responses that seem to indicate anomalies, difficulties, or 
conflicts between operational realities and official policy lead to follow up questions to 
further explore the issues.  
Procedures for Pilot Study 
The pilot study consisted primarily of preliminary interviews with key 
participants, augmented by review of related official documentation. Two participants 
were chosen for this purpose. This served to ensure that the study was feasible, based on 
access to the research environment and participants, and on the expectation that 
observable activities would occur with sufficient frequency during the course of the 
study, to enable adequate observation and data collection. To some extent, some elements 
of the pilot study were previously completed, in the process of gaining access to 
introductory information, such as that provided in the infrastructure liaison officer-
training course. Preliminary discussions, but not interviews, were conducted, as part of 
the feasibility determination.  
To further ensure appropriateness of interview questions, three preliminary 
interviews were conducted. These interviews were used to determine that the questions 
are understandable, and were conducted with participants who were not included in the 
main study. The outcome of this preliminary trial was that the questions were easily 




 Most of the participants were members of agencies holding responsibility for 
some aspect of port security. Some additional participants were also representatives of 
port user organizations, such as shipping companies, warehouse operators, or other 
waterfront businesses. Some of the participants contacted initially were management 
level personnel in the organizations of interest. Officers of the U.S. Coast Guard who 
hold management positions, such as members of the intelligence unit for the port, 
represent one such category of participant. Also, senior officers in the various police 
agencies and other emergency response agencies were included in the initial contact list. 
Based on responses from these individuals, additional participants were identified, with 
particular attention focused on those personnel who had regular working interfaces with 
counterparts in other agencies, whether those interfaces are formally directed through 
official policy, or informally conducted, through unofficial understandings among 
colleagues. Some participants from commercial or private user organizations were also 
included. This category of participant served only as independent evaluators of the degree 
to which security officials’ assessments of noninterference with normal operations were 
viewed to be accurate, and their responses were not included in the analysis of results. 
It was also deemed desirable to include some security officials from commercial 
companies. Two such individuals were interviewed, and their responses were included in 
the analyses, because, as security personnel, their responses were considered to be 
relevant in the same way as the members of government agencies. Finally, there were 
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some interviews with personnel from peripheral areas, such as the neighboring port that 
utilizes some of the common waterways and land approaches. These participants were 
recruited primarily from emergency response organizations that have regular interaction 
with counterparts in the study seaport. Because they were not regularly working within 
the research environment, their responses were not included in the analyses, but served as 
corroborative data. 
To ensure ethical protection of the rights of all participants, no identification was 
made of any participants, even if some were willing to be identified or quoted. In this 
way, there was no possibility of inadvertent identification by omission. General 
descriptions of the types of participants were substituted for specific identities, and the 
coding scheme, described elsewhere in this document, was used to further ensure the 
anonymity of participants. 
Although the characteristics of the ports made it difficult to mask their identities, 
even when names of the facilities are omitted, identities of individual organizations were 
omitted, wherever such omissions were feasible. Some organizational information, such 
as published, public domain policies, organization charts, and procedures, or minutes of 
open commission hearings, will necessarily identify their origins. Because these are 
already in the public domain, this should not pose an ethical issue, as long as no direct 
links are made between the published documents and individual participants who 
implement or comment on them.  
62 
 
Data Collection  
This primarily consisted of interviews with participants, and observations of 
interactions among individuals from different agencies. Interview and observation data 
were augmented by document reviews, especially public domain documents related to 
interagency procedures and policies. Observation data consisted of researcher notes 
which listed and described observed activities, with particular attention to cooperative 
actions among members of different organizations. 
Potential participants were identified through observations in the various work 
areas of the port, including piers, boatyards, cargo loading areas, warehouse areas, and 
ground transfer and shipping areas. Each participant was assigned a code number, known 
only to me.  
Working from the random list of potential participants, initial contacts were made 
in the normal work area of each participant. At that time, the participant was told that the 
study was ongoing, and was requested to participate through an interview. If the 
participant agreed to the interview, an arrangement was made to meet at the participant’s 
convenience, at a site that was mutually acceptable, and which offered sufficient privacy 
to avoid inadvertent disclosure of participants’ responses. 
At the outset of the interview meeting, the participant was briefed on the nature 
and purpose of the study, and was presented with the consent form, and asked to read and 
sign it. Prior to commencement of the interview, the participant was given the 
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opportunity to ask questions about the study, privacy issues, or other general questions 
about the nature and use of the data to be gathered.  
A facilitating factor in this study is my former relationships with some of the 
participants and participant organizations, which helped to provide access and trust which 
might otherwise be difficult to attain. Preliminary conversations with some key 
individuals indicated that adequate access would be available. Likewise, preliminary 
review of public access documents has confirmed that sufficient documentary data was 
available to provide guidance related to official policy, and to serve as comparison 
baselines for analyzing the correspondence between officially sanctioned procedures and 
observed interactions. While not included for interpretation and analysis, the existence of 
the official policy guidance was confirmed through this process. 
Interviews, while carefully planned as to content and mode of interaction, were 
conducted in an informal manner, as much as practicable. This was to encourage 
maximum openness from participants, and to draw out detailed information on the topics 
of interest.  
Arrangements were made in the manner described above, to meet at a convenient 
location, preferably in or near the participant’s usual work site. The interviews each 
lasted approximately one hour, unless follow up was needed. Only two such follow up 
interviews were required, and resulted from observations that indicated a need for 
specific explanation of the events observed. These follow up discussions were brief, and 
were conducted near the sites of the observations, by mutual consent. 
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In general, the topics of the questions corresponded to the fundamental questions 
addressed in the study, but with a greater level of detail. The actual questions were 
designed to elicit information about the research questions. Participants, especially those 
who took part in the earlier parts of the study, were encouraged to suggest further lines of 
inquiry, should they be aware of issues that were not covered in the planned questions. 
To help promote this type of voluntary additional discussion, each participant was briefed 
on the general purpose of the study, and the uses to which the results were to be 
employed. To help ensure that a reasonable sample of participant views would be 
gathered, it was intended that approximately 20 participants would be selected for these 
interviews. As the interview process proceeded, though, the unanimity of key responses 
created a condition of data saturation, so that the interview process was halted after a total 
of seventeen participants had responded. 
 The principal source of guidance for structuring the interview process has been 
Martella and colleagues’ (1999) study. It provided guidance for all aspects of the process. 
Choice of participants, content of the interviews, mode of interaction, and formatting and 
sequencing of questions was in accordance with this guide. Familiarity with the study 
environment and the participants proved to be a significant factor. My own experience in 
the environment, combined with some of the organizations involved (although not in a 
security related capacity), has been a factor in my selection of the nature of the study 
topic and the study design. This fact tended to enhance my credibility, as well as the 
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degree of trust I enjoyed from participants, which seemed to positively influence their 
willingness to speak openly.  
As mentioned above, participants received a general briefing on the study and its 
purposes at the time that interviews were scheduled. At the start of the actual interviews, 
a more detailed briefing was provided, including a description of the study objectives and 
general questions to be addressed. The objective was to gain information about actual 
inter-agency cooperation, and the manner in which the cooperation has come into being. 
For this reason, the open format of the interviews did not appear to materially affect the 
outcome, and seemed to elicit responses that originated with the participant, rather than 
being previously anticipated by the researcher.  
Data Analysis  
Data coding for analysis consisted of open and axial coding, in the manner 
described by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The open coding identified and developed 
concepts associated with properties and dimensions of raw data collected through 
interviews and observations of ongoing activities of personnel in the research 
environment. Through this process, data points could be examined for similarities and 
differences, to establish categories into which data items were grouped. These categories 
were then analyzed for use in the second coding process, which is axial coding. 
Axial coding consisted of examining the categories from the open coding process, 
to find connections among them, in terms of context, conditions, actions and interactions, 
and consequences. This facilitated establishing relationships among the categories of 
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data, to infer causal factors, describe common or contrasting properties of the categories, 
and to describe actions that are taken by participants in their efforts to address the 
conditions and phenomena. Although Strauss and Corbin (1990) described techniques for 
achieving a grounded theory research design, and their techniques included more than 
just open and axial coding, those two techniques proved to be sufficient for the present 
purpose. This analysis helped yield indications of the outcomes and consequences of the 
actions, which, in turn supported the ultimate analysis of the data, in relation to the 
research questions. 
With 17 participants each answering 20 questions, and each question yielding 
multiple data points from each participant, there was as a result, a very large number of 
data points. Because the amount of data is was sufficiently large to make manual 
manipulations of the data, as described above, difficult and time consuming, I employed a 
qualitative data analysis software package, to help organize and categorize the data. This 
not only reduced the time required to complete the analysis, but also helped identify 
categories and conclusions that might have been missed through manual examination, 
alone. 
Document review. As a means of comparing official policy with observed 
operations, available policy and procedure documents were examined. Because most of 
the participants were members of public organizations, sufficient documentary 
information was available to enable an adequate examination of official guidance for 
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interaction of the security organizations under study. These documents are in the public 
domain, and most, if not all, are available online. 
Other sources of general official guidance were also made available, such as the 
infrastructure liaison officer course materials. These materials outlined general processes 
for identifying potential threats, and for communicating resultant data among agencies, 
and between official agencies and nongovernmental entities with an interest in mitigating 
security threats. Various public-access meetings, documents, and special events have also 
proved to be valuable sources of general data about issues and preferred modes of 
interaction among interested entities. Review of this kind of data has helped inform the 
process of developing interview topics and questions. 
During the planning process for this study, it was anticipated that there would be 
enough publicly available documents to support the research project, and this proved to 
be the case. Two principal areas of interest were associated with these documents. The 
first concerned participant compliance with, and attitudes toward the documents. The 
second concerned the degree to which official guidance was consistent between agencies. 
Although discontinuities or conflicting guidance would constitute a significant finding, 
none were found among local agencies. Some discontinuities were alluded to in the 
interviews, but these were between local agencies and those operating from outside the 
research environment. These offered some indication of opportunities for useful further 
study, but were considered to be beyond the scope of the current effort. 
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Observations of activities. Observations of operational activities focused 
primarily on those activities that required interaction among agencies, or which involved 
responses to emergent situations that may generate the need for interaction. During the 
observational process, the researcher watched people working in the research 
environment, and made notes of the observed activities. The principal factor of interest in 
these observations was the manner in which the interactions came about. For example, 
one specific factor was the apparent automatic assumption of tasks by various group 
members, or the lack of automatic assumption. If negotiation on the site was observed, 
this was taken as an indication that there may have been some gap in the interaction 
protocol, and follow-up interviews would probably have been indicated. The observations 
were recorded in the form of notes taken by the researcher at the time the observations 
are made. These notes constituted the observational data used in the interpretation 
process. During the course of the study, no such negotiations were observed, which 
indicated that either formal or informal protocols were already in place. 
Whatever the nature of the activities, some follow-up was nevertheless conducted, 
to help interpret the observations. Even in cases where all participants seemed to interact 
in a habitual, predetermined manner, it was found to be useful to ascertain the origin of 
the apparent interactive protocol. As with interviews, observations of ongoing activity in 
the research environment were coded sequentially and chronologically. The in-process 
preliminary evaluations were used for quality assessment purposes in a manner similar to 
that described above for interview data. 
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Although the intention was to perform observations in areas that are open to the 
public, there is the possibility of data emerging during the course of the study that could 
require observations in areas that are not available for unrestricted public access. Should 
it have become necessary or desirable to perform observations in areas where special 
permission was required for entry or observations, such permission was intended to be 
obtained in writing, and submitted to the Walden Institutional Review Board, approval 
number 10-24-14-0145037, for approval. This proved to be unnecessary, as sufficient 
data was obtained through observations in public access areas. 
Triangulation. Several means of triangulation were employed to enhance the 
credibility of the data. Data triangulation was accomplished through the analysis process, 
by comparing responses of various participants, particularly those who worked in 
different organizations, or whose tasks differ from one another. In this way, anomalies 
could be detected and resolved through follow-up activities, or through other types of 
triangulation. 
Methodological triangulation was accomplished primarily through comparison of 
data gathered through interviews, with data gathered through observation of activities. 
This was further augmented with data from published, official documentation. In this 
way, researcher observations were used to corroborate or question responses from 
individual participants who answered questions during interviews. Some additional 
triangulation was achieved through comparison of official documentation to interview 
responses and observed activities. 
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness was enhanced by the triangulation and cross agency 
comparisons, as well as the fact that my contact with the research participants was 
available to continue for as long as seemed useful for checking and rechecking 
observations. An associate who currently works in a peripheral role in the research 
environment also agreed to serve as an informal peer reviewer, to help ensure that any 
serious misinterpretations were identified. This peer consultation has already been 
completed, with suggestions and observations accommodated.  
 Houghton et al. (2013) provided a useful description of the qualities necessary to 
satisfy requirements for valid and reliable research, as well as techniques for maintaining 
these qualities during the course of planning, executing, and reporting the research 
project. Additionally, Houghton et al. (2013) offered descriptions of extra, desirable 
qualities and procedures that augment the value of research findings. Several of the 
recommendations from Houghton et al. (2013) have been included in the planning and 
execution of the research project.  
Dependability 
In general, both Houghton et al. (2013) and Yin (2009) described reliability (or 
dependability) in terms that could also be called repeatability. For this study, repeatability 
was maintained by thorough documentation of all activities, including the manner of 
selection research participants, the modes of interaction between the researcher and 
participants, the specific selection of documents reviewed, and the interpretations of these 
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documents in relation to the research environment. Finally, to the greatest extent 
practicable, the general conditions prevailing within the research environment was also 
described in detail. These conditions included the kinds of work or other activity 
observed, the presence or absence of specific threats during the observation period, and 
other potentially influential factors, such as ship movements, cargo transfers, large scale 
civilian recreational activities, or other factors that may have influenced the actions of the 
personnel being observed. 
Confirmability 
 According to Creswell (2007), validation or confirmability, can be one of the 
most vulnerable factors in producing a credible case study, and, if not adequately 
addressed, may leave the research (and the researcher), open to criticism for producing 
work that does not justify its findings and conclusions. To prevent this, Yin (2009) 
recommended three, mutually reinforcing techniques: (a) use multiple sources of 
evidence, (b) establish chain of evidence, and (c) have key informants review draft case 
study report. 
Without these techniques, the research may be subject to criticism that the work, 
“fails to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that ‘subjective’ 
judgments are used to collect the data” (Yin, 2009, p. 41). Houghton et al. (2013) 
reinforced this recommendation, by suggesting exercise of what they called audit trail 
vigour to permit readers of the research report to determine for themselves if they agree 
with the procedures and conclusions described by the producer of the research. These 
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kinds of validating activities can help support a claim of objectivity, even in cases where 
the researcher has a perspective that may make objectivity difficult to defend. 
Credibility 
For this type of study, one of the most significant threats to credibility is the 
potential for induced bias and inconsistency, as the study progresses (Yin, 2009). As the 
researcher becomes aware of the trend of responses among participants, it would be 
natural to anticipate the responses and to modify the form and content of questions asked. 
Any change in form or content between interviews would introduce researcher bias. This 
undesirable influence would thus render later responses noncomparable to earlier ones. 
To combat this tendency, each successive interview was planned in the context of 
previous interviews, with contingency questions decided in advance. In this way, some 
potential for bias could be detected and mitigated during the planning process. Although 
imperfect, strict adherence to the process rigor prescribed by Houghton et al. (2013) was 
employed to minimize the negative effect of researcher bias. 
Further mitigation of bias was accomplished by use of the chronological and 
sequential assessment codes described above. Identification of progressive trends in 
responses was expected to reveal the possible influence of bias, which could then be 
subjected to further analysis, and, if warranted, modification. One further measure that 
can help maintain credibility is for the researcher to perform a thorough self assessment 
of personal expectations, values, and relevant experiences that influence selection of 
questions, participants, and issues to be explored (Diefenbach, 2009). The suggested 
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process involved introspective examination of personal reasons for selecting the specific 
factors to be researched, with the intention of identifying and explaining the selections. 
According to Diefenbach (2009), this technique can help enhance credibility, and can 
also be useful for other readers of the research report in conducting their own evaluations 
of the objectivity of the research. With this self-assessment in place, each successive set 
of interviews, observations, and interpretations can be compared to the assessment, as a 
means of establishing a personal baseline. This is, of course, at least as subjective as any 
other method, but once established, became another consistent measure of validity. 
Application of these techniques seemed to be of benefit, and the results of the 
interviews did not indicate any excessive researcher bias. This belief was reinforced by 
the fact that both the manual and software analyses of the interview data indicated 
significant stylistic, linguistic, and content variability on the parts of the participants. 
Transferability 
For purposes of this study, transferability relates to the degree to which the 
findings and conclusions may be applicable to transportation hubs other than the one in 
which this study has been conducted (Singleton & Straits, 2010). Although generalization 
of the findings cannot be automatically assumed, some generalizations have been 
accepted as implicit in preparation for the study. The first of these implicit 
generalizations is the fact that all transportation hubs should expect to face similar types 
and sources of security threats. 
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To help establish transferability, and to enhance the general usefulness of the 
findings, thorough description of the research environment, exposition of its unique 
characteristics, and explanation of the complexities of interagency policies and 
jurisdictions has been included in the research report. The procedures to protect 
dependability, such as maintaining a rigorous and thorough evidentiary audit trail, and 
utilizing review assistance from outside observers, have also helped support an assertion 
of transferability. A final note on transferability is to avoid attempting to excessively 
generalize the findings, or to form a generalizable theory. This avoidance, described by 
Diefenbach (2009), can help maintain credibility of the study and its conclusions, by 
acknowledging the fact that the study was based on the activities of one researcher, 
working from a personal perspective, with realistically limited objectives, other potential 
users of the study can make their own assessments of its potential application to their 
own work or further research of the subject. 
Ethical Considerations 
The entire data collection process has been designed to scrupulously avoid ethical 
issues, especially those related to protection of privacy rights of individuals. The coding 
process, the aggregation of data in a manner that avoids individual attribution, and 
identification of type of work, rather than specific organizational membership of 
participants, all were designed to prevent inadvertent identification of participants. 
Description of these safeguards was included in the participant briefing, which did seem 
to further increase the willingness of participants to speak frankly about experiences and 
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issues, related to collaboration among members of their own organizations, and in 
multiple-agency activities. Willingness to speak frankly was also enhanced by the fact 
that participants were presented with a copy of the informed consent form, which was 
explained to them before they signed the form. 
Summary 
The nature of the research environment, combined with the availability of 
participants has served to make a case study both desirable and feasible. The growing 
interest in data that can support improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
security operations at transportation hubs has given this study substantial current 
relevance, and the access to the participants and research environment that has been 
provided ensures that a meaningful addition to the body of information about the subject 
has been achieved. 
The research plan has been based primarily on interviews with participants, in an 
open ended format, which was intended to explore, and then describe the dynamics of 
interaction among the many agencies that share responsibility for security at the seaport. 
Observations of several types of interactions were added to the plan, to provide continuity 
among the various inputs from participant interviews, as well as corroboration and 
independent evaluation of the interactions described in those interviews. A substantial 
number of official documents, which describe the policies and procedures that top-level 
administrators have prescribed for the interactions have also been identified and studied. 
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This has allowed for further comparison between official intentions, perceptions 
and expectations of operational personnel, and observable activities related to those 
intentions and perceptions. Together, these elements have coalesced into a research 
project that provided a confident expectation that the findings and conclusions are 
meaningful, with the potential for supporting further refinement of interactive 
effectiveness among agencies at the port, and perhaps at other facilities with similar 
needs and mandates. 
The following chapters include descriptions and discussions of the outcome of the 
research. Chapter 4 includes details of the results of the work, while Chapter 5 includes 




Chapter 4: Results  
 The purpose of this work was to explore issues that can hamper efficiency of 
security agency operation and collaboration, and to identify actions that have enhanced 
collaboration. To do this, I used a case study design, with data collection being primarily 
through interviews, augmented by observations of participants’ activities in the research 
site. The observations were of ongoing activities conducted as part of the normal course 
of business. 
 Participants were randomly chosen from various organizations that were chartered 
to provide security related services  at the research site, and the observations were made 
at various locations, at various times of day. To accomplish this, I followed a consistent 
process of contacting potential participants, obtaining their agreement to participate, and 
conducting the interviews. Likewise, with observations, I followed a consistent protocol 
for duration and observation. This protocol involved observing each area studied for 
approximately 3 hours, regardless of location or time of day. 
 To encourage open and thorough responses to questions, I offered all participants 
my personal assurance that their identities would be held in strictest confidence, a 
promise reinforced by a written form. A copy of this form is provided in Appendix A. 
Additionally, I described to each participant the identification scheme, which assigned a 
code number in place of the participant’s name. This code number was substituted for the 
names in all notes and analytical documents to further ensure confidentiality  
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 To enhance dependability, I used a single set of interview questions with each 
participant. This set of questions is provided in Appendix B. In addition to aiding in 
consistency, its use may also contribute to the dependability of this study, should other 
researchers wish to attempt replication. Although more than 20 organizations have 
responsibility for some aspect of security at the port, participants were selected only from 
those agencies that maintain a permanent operating facility within the confines of the 
port. In this way, the sample was drawn from a population all of which worked in the 
research environment. The total population size was sufficiently small that a 
representative sample would be small enough to be manageable within the practical limits 
of the study design. 
 This chapter  includes the demographic characteristics of the participants, to the 
extent that those characteristics were relevant to the purpose. It also includes a 
description and results of a brief pilot study. Finally, the chapter includes descriptions of 
the research environment, the data collection processes used, the methods of analyzing 
the data, evidence of trustworthiness, and a chapter summary.  
Pilot Study 
 The pilot study was intended to ensure that the nature and purpose of the study 
was comprehensible to the kinds of individuals who participated in the main study. By 
this means, I was able to verify that the written privacy assurance that was provided to 
each participant was clearly understandable. As in the main research, I also informed 
participants of their rights and protections related to their participation.  
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 Two individuals were chosen from the same population as the participant group, 
but who were not participants in the primary research project. The explanation of the 
nature and purpose of the project given in the pilot study was the same one used in the 
main interview process. Likewise, the same privacy document was explained and 
provided to each pilot study participant. After this introduction, the pilot study 
participants were asked to describe their understanding of the briefing content. Both pilot 
study participants were able to demonstrate clear understanding of the key points, as well 
as their rights and protections. As a result, the briefing and privacy document were 
determined to be appropriate to the purpose. 
Setting 
 The research environment consisted of a large, multiuse seaport, with facilities for 
accommodating container and bulk cargo ships, as well as smaller vessels. Most of the 
facilities are on an island, surrounded by a narrow waterway that provides access to pier 
facilities. Pier facilities house numerous rail-mounted cranes, with provisions for 
immediate removal of offloaded cargo, and for staging of cargo to be loaded onto ships. 
There are also several hundred acres of accommodation for surface transportation of 
goods, including truck and rail transport facilities. Warehouse complexes and facilities 
for providing maintenance and repair of ships, boats, and ground transport vehicles 
augment these facilities. 
 In addition to the facilities that support large-scale cargo handling, there are also 
numerous recreational, marine research, and commercial facilities, such as pleasure boat 
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docks, retail businesses, and dining establishments. Finally, there are several facilities 
housing official, security-related organizations, as well as a medium security prison.  
Waterways 
 The principal waterways consist of a single, main channel, which is approached 
via an outer harbor that is protected by a sea wall. Outside of the sea wall, in the open 
ocean, there are numerous designated anchorages for large ships awaiting clearance to 
enter the port. Smaller waterways, providing access to marinas and other facilities 
requiring waterborne approaches, are cut into the island from the main channel, or from 
the outer harbor. 
Added Complexities 
 A major, added complexity, both operationally and organizationally, is the 
existence of another large seaport adjacent to the venue of this study. This port is under 
the jurisdiction of a different political structure from the study venue (a different city 
operates it) and has its own security agencies, several of which operate in parallel with 
those in the study venue. Furthermore, the two ports share several of the waterways, as 
well as the roads, bridges, and railways that serve the venue port. This nearby, and 
sometimes overlapping set of organizational jurisdictions, increases the criticality of 
ensuring that security operations are coordinated and cooperative. This feature was 
included in the current study, because it unavoidably affected some of the issues that 
arose during the data gathering phase. Even so, because the intention was to include only 
organizations that maintained permanent facilities within the confines of the study port, 
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no organizations from the adjacent port were included. The existence of this proximate 
facility did influence some of the recommendations for further study that have been 
included later in this report. 
 
Figure 1. View of a section of the port, showing piers for ship mooring and cargo 
transfer. 
Demographics 
 Study participants were all members of local organizations, and were expected to 
be familiar with the local environment. This condition was expected to give the 
participants a common focus on security related issues within the research environment. 
Other demographic data, such as ethnicity and gender, were not considered to be directly 
relevant to the study purpose, and were not recorded. 
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Categorization of Participants 
 Because cooperation among individuals and organizations was the primary focus 
of the study, the principal descriptor chosen for participants was the kind of work they 
did. This enabled a concentration on issues related to getting the tasks accomplished, 
within each of the general areas of specialization practiced by the individuals who took 
part in the research. It also enhanced the identification of differences among the various 
organizations in policies and procedures related to similar tasks. 
 Participants were characterized by one of three categories reflecting their primary 
functions: law enforcement, safety and rescue, regulatory enforcement. This 
categorization was maintained irrespective of the primary function of their home 
organizations, because some agencies have multiple roles in port security, and it was the 












Table 1  
Number of Participants by Specialty and Home Agency Type 
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Note. Rows depict mission responsibilities of home organizations; columns depict 
number of participants by personal specialty or current assignment. 
Data Collection 
 The data collection process consisted of a combination of interviews with 
participants who work in jobs related to maintenance of security within the port 
perimeter, observations of those kinds of personnel in their working environment, and 
study of official documents that pertain to the operation of security related agencies. The 
primary source of data was the interviews augmented by the observations. The document 
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search served to help provide context and understanding of the objectives and priorities 
of the agencies involved. 
Interviews 
 Although the plan called for interviews with 20 participants, the results began to 
approach saturation after approximately 12 interviews had been completed. Results from 
an additional five interviews, which had already been arranged, did not materially affect 
the outcome. As a result, the final three interviews were not scheduled. 
 The interviews were conducted in locations in or near the research environment, 
and were chosen by the participant. The duration of the interviews averaged 
approximately ninety minutes, with some lasting only 1 hour, and others extending 
beyond 2 hours. I also did two follow-up interviews that resulted from observations of 
activities in the research environment. These follow-up interviews occurred at or near the 
sites of the observations, lasted only a few minutes each, and were specifically for the 
purpose of explaining the observed activities. 
 The results of the interviews were initially recorded as hand written notes taken 
during each interview, which were transcribed later, usually in the same day. During the 
transcription process, any data missing from the notes were filled in from interviewer 
memory. As expected, the participants who agreed to be interviewed showed little or no 
reluctance to answer the questions fully and openly. Before concluding each interview, I 
would explain my understanding of participant responses, to ensure that I was accurately 




 Seventeen observations were conducted within the boundaries of the research 
environment, that is, within the confines of the subject seaport. Each of the observations 
involved at least one member of an organization to which one of the participants 
belonged, although not all of the observed individuals were interview participants. They 
were conducted at random intervals, for a period of three to four hours each.  Because 
four of the observations involved interactions between members of one or more of the 
organizations included in the study, and, as stated above, two of the observations 
stimulated follow up interviews. 
 To perform the observations, I positioned myself in a vantage point within the 
port from which I could watch activities over a wide area. In some cases this entailed 
watching ongoing work in an area where members of one or more of the organizations 
conducted their usual activities. In other instances, the areas under observation required 
only intermittent activity by any of the organizations of interest. For example, one area 
observed contained a dispatch station, from which organization members regularly 
emerged and proceeded to some other point where their presence was required. For some 
of these, I was able to follow the individuals, to watch what kinds of activities or 
interactions resulted. 
 In some other instances, I would merely watch a wide area that was under the 
jurisdiction of one of the organizations. When any activity occurred, I would make note 
of the nature of the activity, as well as any interactions between members of more than 
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one of the organizations of interest. If the purpose of the interactions were not clearly 
evident, I would follow up with in person questions, requesting explanation or 
clarification. 
 While necessarily random, I found these observations necessary to clarify 
information obtained through the interview process, and also to corroborate some of the 
information provided by participants. The random nature of the observations, combined 
with the fact that many kinds of activities do not occur at predictable times, resulted in 
limitations on the extent and detail of the data obtained. These limitations are explained 
in the section entitled Limitations, in Chapter 5. 
Documents 
 Additionally, publicly available policy statements and directives, pertaining to 
operations of security agencies at the port, were also examined. Although useful, these 
documents did not yield any data that was included in the data analyses. They did; 
however, serve as background to assist me in comprehending observed activities.  
Data Analysis 
 Three modes of data analysis were used for this study: general perusal of all 
recorded data by me, a manual comparison of interview responses to observations, and 
entry of all interview transcripts into NVivo 10 software, for detection and identification 
of major themes and commonalities in the interview responses. Each of these modes was 
useful in different ways. For example, the general perusal helped to verify consistency in 
data collection and collation. Comparison of observations to interview responses was 
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most useful in the fact that some previously unidentified activities yielded additional data 
that had not emerged from other modes of inquiry. Finally, the NVivo software helped 
me to accomplish the task of identifying themes that were evidenced by the frequency of 
appearance of specific subjects or ideas. This mode of analysis provided some of the 
most useful elements of data examination for inductive study of responses related to the 
research questions. 
Identification of Categories and Themes 
 One of the expected themes that did not appear was a concentration of attention 
to, and awareness of the importance of cyber security. Because of the increasing 
incidence of this type of threat in many environments, it was anticipated, during the 
planning for this research, that most personnel in security related jobs would be aware, if 
not preoccupied, with this issue. This absence was noted during the general perusal of 
collected data. An example of the lack is evident in the following typical response 
regarding the types of threats to port security the participant was aware of. As participant 
identified as E-3 stated: 
 We have to watch for everything. Terrorists, speeders, drug dealers, and a lot of 
 drunks.  
 We also get burglaries. There’s a lot of valuable cargo that goes through here, 





Most of the responses to this question were similar to the one above. Although some of 
the responses were considerably more detailed than this example, only two mentioned 
cyber security, and those did not afford it any special significance. 
 Another unexpected absence was the lack of emphasis on use of the Fusion 
Center by participants. Only a small number of participants even mentioned the Fusion 
Center, although all seemed to be aware of its existence. Those who did mention it did 
not allude to it as having any special significance in their routine execution of their 
duties, except for occasional inputs of information. The one response that seemed to give 
the Fusion Center the greatest significance was from an individual, identified as 
participant E-5, whose principal work involved waterfront law enforcement. 
We work for the Chief, but I know he has to listen to a lot of people. The mayor, 
the [port executive director], even the [USCG] captain of the port. They all have a 
say in what we do and how we do it. I guess the feds get into it sometimes, 
especially if it’s about drugs or terrorists. We also get calls from the [Fusion] 
Center. Sometimes it’s something important. Mostly not  (participant E-5, 
personal communication, November 5, 2014). 
 During planning for this study, I had expected the Fusion Center to be central to 
the operation and cooperation of agencies on the waterfront, because of the emphasis and 
major allocation of resources by DHS. According to the data collected for this study, the 
security operatives in this research environment did not consider it to be of major 
significance. I had also been unaware, during the planning phase of my study, that the 
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local Fusion Center was actually located within the boundaries of the neighboring port, 
and not within the research environment, as I had originally understood. For this reason, 
as well as the lack of importance expressed by participants, I omitted the Fusion Center 
from my list of observation sites. 
 One of the more positive themes that emerged from the NVivo analysis was the 
importance of trust. This recurring reference appeared in many of the transcripts, in 
various contexts, but always held special significance. For example, participant S-3, 
whose principal duties involve fire safety and rescue, responded to the question regarding 
informal vs. formal working relationships. 
We are all one team, but everyone knows who is best at certain jobs. We have 
specific, defined assignments, and we work according to the duties of those 
assignments. But there are always some kinds of work that we divide up among 
ourselves. I mean, we also have close friendships. You can’t work in this kind of 
organization without knowing whom you can trust, and trust takes time to build 
up. That trust comes from people being dependable in formal relationships and 
informal relationships. (participant S-3, personal communication, November 1, 
2014) 
This is only one of the many contexts in the data where the concept of trust emerged. The 
NVivo analysis disclosed widespread significance of trust in a variety of contexts. 
 Two other significant themes emerged from the data, including the effects of 
jurisdictional issues that occur between organizations, and the influence of competition 
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for funding, especially from federal sources. There were numerous references to these 
issues. They will be discussed more fully in the section on Results. 
 The principal discrepant themes that have emerged from analysis of the data were 
the negative ones discussed above. Most other themes were consistent with objectives 
and expectations that guided the planning for the study. All of these have been discussed 
more fully in the Results section of Chapter 4 and in various parts of Chapter 5. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness  
 The trustworthiness measures described in Chapter 3 have been followed 
throughout the process of planning and executing this study. The principal means of 
attaining trustworthiness has been the systematic process of data gathering, particularly in 
the conduct of interviews. Each interview was conducted using the same set of interview 
questions, in the same sequence. Although participants have been encouraged to 
embellish their responses, each response has been associated with a specific question, and 
all recorded responses have been made in the same sequence. Similarly, the observations 
have all been conducted in the same manner, with the only variations being time of day 
and specific location within the research environment. Strict observational protocol has 
been maintained throughout. 
 The standardization of the data gathering process, and the systematic execution, 
should allow for accurate replication by other researchers who might desire to make the 
attempt. Review of documentation was similarly systematic and replicable, because all 
documents selected were available to the public. The comparison of these sources of data 
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has provided a means of triangulation, and no major anomalies have emerged. These 
same techniques have contributed to credibility, by demonstrating consistency in both the 
data gathering process and in data analysis. Transferability has been made implicit, in 
that the types of organizations involved have been identified, and their relationships 
described. Given that other transportation hubs face similar threats, comparison and 
contrast can be done by examination of issues in the present research environment against 
those of other environments.  
 Dependability has been maintained through strict adherence to data gathering and 
data analysis protocols. Any other researcher should be able to replicate the study by 
following them. This is also true for confirmability, in that the kind of audit trail of 
evidence, as recommended by Houghton et al. (2013), has been provided through 
exposition of data and the methods employed to analyze it. 
Results 
 The data gathering process has yielded answers to the research questions in a way 
that can be used to identify significant influencing factors, as well as providing bases for 
recommendations for future actions. While both formal and informal relationships among 
individuals and organizations were found to exist, there were some conflicts identified 
between official policy and practical execution of individual duties. The manner in which 
these conflicts have been routinely resolved may prove to be instructive, and the factors 
that enable individuals to confidently reconcile the conflicts should also prove useful. 
RQ 1 and Related Themes 
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RQ1: What security-related working relationships existed among all observable 
entities within the research environment? 
 Theme 1: Command Media. All participants acknowledged that formal 
relationships were defined by some type of command media, depending on the type of 
organization the participant represented. Those elements of the relationships that related 
to general mission of the organizations, and the manner in which the individuals’ duties 
were to be performed, were generally seen by the participants to be unequivocal and 
reasonable. 
 In some cases where formalized interagency cooperation replaced existing, 
informal relationships, effective transition was accomplished by codifying existing 
protocols, rather than by establishing completely new ones. An example of this was the 
allocation of diving services. Divers from various agencies have historically responded to 
the need for their services in an ad hoc, cooperative manner, with each event being 
organized at the time of need. Generally, the dive team with the specific capability that 
was most appropriate to the incident would act as the lead team, with the others operating 
under the lead team’s direction. The new, formalized protocol has been established in 
much the same way, with the only substantive difference being that the request is 
initiated through a central office within the port area, and the appropriate teams are called 
in. According to the participants with knowledge of this arrangement, the formalized 
process works at least as well as the informal one it replicated. 
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 While relationships between agencies were considered generally effective and 
functional, many participants saw them as being impeded by protection of organizational 
jurisdiction, and by competition for funding. Members recognized this kind of high-level 
rivalry within all the agencies involved in the study, even when working-level individuals 
enjoyed congenial and cooperative relationships among themselves. Although the sample 
size was small, the number of participants who identified incompatibilities between 
formal guidance and practical necessity for effective functioning was significant (see 
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Compatible       9        3  
Incompatible/  
adequate 
        1         3 
Incompatible/ 
adequate  
        4         1 
 
Note. If a new process was seen to be similar to the one it replaced, it was characterized 
as compatible. If different, the question was whether the new one functioned adequately. 
If no previous process existed the same functionality question applied.  
 Existing formal processes of long standing were seen as compatible with 
functionality. Participants also believed that new, formal processes that largely adopted 
existing informal processes were acceptable. Likewise, some new processes that were 
seen as being incompatible with current practice, that is, they changed to new practices, 
were nevertheless acceptable. This was because, although different, they adequately 
served the purpose. Finally, though, there were new, formal processes that were seen as 
unacceptable, because they failed to serve the stated purpose in practical application.  
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 Of the 21 new procedures noted by participants, there were four new ones that 
replaced existing, informal processes, but did not adequately accommodate the 
functionality of the processes they replaced.  One new process was promulgated that had 
no predecessor, either formal or informal.  It was identified as unacceptable, even though 
it was intended to address a newly recognized need.  This was because the participant 
found that the new process did not function as intended. 
 These observations indicated that some problems existed in the development of 
new, formalized processes.  Perhaps this is because of a lack of adequate investigation 
prior to introduction of new procedures.  Alternatively, it may be caused by conflicts 
among agencies that resulted in compromises that sacrificed functionality for mutual 
acceptability.  Either way, further study is warranted to make improvements in such 
policies and procedures. 
 One participant, E-5, noted that some agencies seem to cooperate better than 
others. The difference seen by this participant, as well as several others, as being a 
difference in agreement between high-level officials of the various agencies. In this 
individual’s experience, there was one particular agency that did not cooperate well. 
We have jurisdiction over anything that goes down in the port, unless it belongs to 
the [local law enforcement agency with multiarea jurisdiction]. So, maybe we 
should be able to work past the [borders of the port] when we’re onto something. 
But otherwise, we do just about everything. 
 [On the protectionism issue, the same participant went on]: 
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It doesn’t happen very often, but they guard their turf. We don’t have that 
 problem with  [neighboring port security], or with any of the other [agencies]. 
 So, it’s not a very big deal. It just looks bad. Maybe they think we want to  push 
 them out or take their money, or something. I don’t know. (participant E-5, 
 personal communication, November 5, 2014) 
Based on the NVivo analysis, I was able to detect a high degree of consensus on the issue 
of jurisdictional protectionism (see Figure 2). Further, I was able to depict fragments of 
statements from the interview transcripts that contain references to the central theme. In 
this case, the references pertained to incidences of jurisdictional rivalries among high-
level officials of the various agencies represented in the interviews. 
 The analyses depicted in Figures 2-5 consist of key concept words, surrounded by 
fragments of actual sentences of participants in their interviews. These fragments are 





Figure 2. Jurisdictional protectionism, as expressed in participant interviews. 
 
 Participants viewed this kind of high-level rivalry as a result primarily of 
competition for funding, especially funding in the form of grants from DHS. As with the 
jurisdictional protectionism, a majority of participants expressed a belief that budget was 
a motivating factor in their parent organizations’ attitudes toward interagency cooperation 





Figure 3. Participants’ views about effects of competition for budget. 
 
 Theme 2: Informal Relationships. Participants acknowledged that informal 
relationships were a regular and necessary element of their working condition. Such 
relationships exist among peers within the same agency, and also between associates 
from different agencies. These relationships have formed as a means of accommodating 
situations that were not covered by official guidance. As participant R-3 expressed the 
informal relationships among peers within a single agency:  
There are a lot of routine jobs that just get done. It’s a kind of tribal knowledge. 
 Most of the work is covered by policies and procedures, but there are also some 
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 things that just require common sense. (participant R-3, personal communication, 
 November 5, 2014) 
The same participant described the situation with informal relationships between 
members of different agencies in a similar manner: 
There are a lot of activities here in the port that are routine. Even though we have 
policies and procedures that govern how we work, we also have some informal 
arrangements with several local agencies, especially port police and the fire 
department that we use for routine activities. (participant R-3, personal 
communication, November 5, 2014) 
 Many of the participants identified informal relationships, both within and outside 
of their home organizations. Motivational factors influencing these relationships tended 
to fit into three categories: existing personal relationships, habits that resulted from 
frequent operational contacts, and the necessity of pooling resources or relying on unique 
capabilities of some participants. These tended to be similar, whether the relationships 
existed within single organizations, across organizational lines, or in combination of 
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Note. Specific numerical values resulted from somewhat arbitrary choices of relational 
words from the interview data set. However, use of synonyms would have produced 
similar numbers, with the same motivational factors. 
RQ 2 and Related Themes 
RQ2: How have informal working relationships formed, and what factors have 
kept them functioning? 
Theme 3: Trust. The single most significant factor identified by participants that 
influenced informal, cooperative relationships, whether among members of a single 
organization, or across organizational lines, was the trust that existed between the 
individuals involved.  The majority of participants specifically identified this factor, to 





Figure 4. The role of trust in building cooperative relationships. 
 
 While trust often emerged as a byproduct of familiarity among participants within 
organizations, as well as across organizational lines, there were other influencing factors. 
Among these influencing factors were leadership and habitual integrity of individual 
members in the conduct of their interactions. Leadership, as defined by Schein (2010), 
was acknowledged and evident in many components of the study.  
 Whether formally defined, or exercised on individual initiative, leadership was 
evident and necessary for the successful operation of the organizations involved. 
Likewise, individual integrity of organizations’ members was indispensable to the 
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development of mutual trust. Trust can also be a requirement of policy, in that some 
official procedures impose interdependency among participants. Although this kind of 
trust may be seen as directed, and thus insincere, it can lead to behaviors on the part of 
participants that result in earned trust. 
Table 4 
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       2 
Leaders        17        2         6 
Subordinates        20                 12 
 
Note. There may be some overlap in the absolute numbers, because some trust 
 begins with policy mandates, but develops into sincere trust, due to habitual 
 integrity of the individuals involved. 
 As participant R-4 described these factors, both leadership and individual 
integrity were necessary to the functioning of an effective organization: 
Like any good team, all members cooperate and recognize the shared goals we all 
support. Under good leadership, cooperation and success are rewarded; so all 
members are motivated to generate efficiency and successful outcomes. Healthy 
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working relationships naturally flow from those motivations. Many of us are 
acquainted with one another, through working on shared tasks, and through 
occasional social gatherings. Working relationships, both formal and informal, 
result from good people cooperating to achieve a common vision (participant R-4, 
personal communication, November 9, 2014). 
Although this participant was in a formal leadership position, others expressed the same 
types of sentiments. As one working-level participant, identified as E-3, stated it: 
 Somebody has to take the lead. If everybody else trusts [the leader], they do their 
 part, and everybody’s better off (participant E-3, personal communication, 
 October 29, 2014). 
Using NVivo, I was able to determine that leadership, while not as frequently cited as a 
critical factor, was sufficiently prevalent in the responses of the participants to generate 
its own relational tree (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. The role of leadership in building cooperative relationships. 
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 Thus, leadership and individual integrity were shown to be interrelated, with each 
factor supporting and sustaining the other. This was exemplified in a statement by 
participant R-5, a leader who acknowledged the importance of leadership integrity in 
maintaining trust among organization members: 
We try to maintain an atmosphere of mutual respect, which includes regard for 
one another’s professionalism.  For that reason, we sometimes work in a relaxed 
and informal manner, and we all trust one another.  But all of our working 
relationships must still conform to the standards that are promulgated for us 
(participant R-5, personal communication, November 9, 2014). 
 Good leaders were seen to inspire confidence in those who were led. This confidence 
spread across organizations. As participant S-2 stated: 
Every force has good people on it.  We all look out for each other. (S-2) 
Inspired individuals tended to act with integrity, which enabled leaders to continue to 
function in their leadership roles, whether formal or informal. As a result, mutual trust 
and cooperative relationships continued. 
RQ 3 and Related Themes 
 RQ3: What kinds of security threats were recognized within the research 
environment, and how were they identified and assigned for action? 
  Theme 4: Security Threats. Participants identified eleven categories of security 
threats. One or more participants acknowledged most threats as part of their assignments, 
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and viewed those to be appropriate to their agencies and individual jobs. A general sense 
of satisfaction with assignment and resources for the assignment was prevalent. 
 The single exception was cyber crime. Of the five participants who acknowledged 
awareness of it as a threat, only two identified cyber threats without having to be 
prompted by the interviewer. The other three responded to a researcher follow-up 
question regarding cyber crime. None of the participants believed they personally had a 
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Note. Chart reflects only threats identified by five or more participants. Several 
 other types of threats were identified, and all were assigned to one or more 
 participants for action. Cyber crime is listed here, because it was the only threat 
 not assigned to any participant. 
Most of the security threats, such as smuggling, burglary, arson, and sabotage 
were identified by, and assigned to, personnel and agencies generally concerned with a 
specific type of threat. Several threats, such as terrorism and smuggling, were assigned to 
more than one organization. Other threats, such as burglary or traffic violations, were 
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assigned specifically to only one agency for each jurisdictional area. This is not to say 
that any agency was specifically prohibited from helping to mitigate these activities 
within their areas of jurisdiction, but primary responsibility was clearly assigned. 
Theme 5: Additional Threats. When asked about additional threats for which 
participants believed they should be responsible, most replied that no additional threats 
would be appropriate for their type of job. Of those who did believe some added 
responsibilities would be appropriate, the most common answer was not addition of new 
threats, but authorization to act outside the boundaries of their normal operating area. 
Although this was not generally stated as a desire for additional assignments, or for 
broader functional operations, it was emphatically declared. It was stated rather as a 
practical matter that would enhance operational effectiveness of existing procedures. As 
one law enforcement officer, E-4, stated: 
We already have responsibility for any kind of threat response, but we should 
 have less restriction on how to respond, especially when it comes to our 
 geographical jurisdiction. I don’t mean just the right of hot pursuit. I mean that 
 if we see something that is outside our boundaries, we should be free to 
 exercise professional discretion to investigate it. As it is, there are things that we 
 can only report, but can’t actively pursue. I have personally seen situations 
 where a suspect got away, because he knew he had been spotted (participant E-4, 
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Note. The desire for wider geographic jurisdiction referred to the ability to 
 investigate or pursue issues beyond current limits. Participants who expressed 
 a desire for additional qualitative jurisdiction identified the same issues: arrivals 
 from domestic sources and cyber crime. 
Theme 6: Unaccounted Threats. Although most participants believed their 
assignments to be generally appropriate to their agency and job, there was some 
controversy about the priorities and concentration of resources associated with mitigating 
the various threats. For example, three participants, representing two different agencies, 
believed that there was not enough emphasis on materials coming into the port from the 
landside, loaded on trucks or rail cars, or empty cargo containers to be returned to their 
country of origin. The participants felt that there was an opportunity for sabotage or other 
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threats to result from insufficient screening of materials delivered from within U.S. 
territory.  
This is not to say that there were no provisions for detecting inappropriate 
material entering from the landside. Official policies and procedures were in place to 
address this kind of issue. Observations did reveal that the policies and procedures 
seemed to be a routine element of normal port operations. Even so, participants such as 
C-1, a civilian security manager for a large material staging, warehousing, and shipping 
facility, did express concern that these policies and procedures were not sufficiently 
detailed and thorough to adequately protect from this kind of threat.  
 
Theft and hijacking are big worries in our facility.  There is a huge amount of 
 valuable cargo that goes through here, so there’s money to be made from stealing 
 it.  That is our biggest worry (participant C-1, personal communication, 
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Note. Most of the concern for unaccounted threats was related to lack of adequate 
tracking, regulation, or inspection of incoming materials from the domestic landside. The 
other category referred to pedestrian, bicycle, and other nonmotorized traffic. 
There were also unexpected gaps in responses concerning the potential for cyber 
terrorism. In addition to this, there was clearly a lack of recognition of the significance of 
the Fusion Center. All of these issues are covered further in Chapter 5, under 
Recommendations. 
Summary 
As intended, I identified a combination of both formal and informal working 
relationships that operate within the research environment. I found the formal 
relationships to be governed by appropriate, documented command media, and that 
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personnel recognized and generally followed them. Where formally mandated 
relationships were not sufficient, or were inappropriate to conditions encountered in the 
working environment, participants developed relationships among themselves to 
accommodate the situation. 
These relationships formed through perceived necessity among functional 
personnel in the normal course of their work. Familiarity and trust grew among the 
participants, which provided them with the confidence to act, as they deemed necessary, 
even though some of their actions were not formally sanctioned by documented policies 
and procedures. The key element influencing development of these working relationships 
was the element of mutual confidence and trust.  
The initiative of individuals exercising leadership qualities, while helpful in 
mitigating some negative factors, was seen as not always being sufficient to overcoming 
all structural, situational, or organizational barriers. Difficulties in maintaining efficient, 
cooperative relationships were seen by the participants as being the result of competition 
among organizations for jurisdictional authority and access to outside sources of funding. 
 Generally, there was consensus among participants about the types and variety of 
security threats they faced in protecting the port. Responsibility for mitigating these 
threats was appropriate to the missions of the home organizations and individual job 
descriptions. Some gaps in emphasis were recognized by participants, who believed that 
additional resources should have been focused on inadequately treated potential threats. 
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Other threats, such as vulnerability to cyber attacks, were not generally recognized as 
major responsibilities. 
The implications of these gaps, and suggested actions to fill them have been 
presented in Chapter 5. The final chapter of this work also contains conclusions from the 
current study. Additionally, it includes acknowledgement of limitations and unresolved 
issues from the current study, and recommendations for further actions and research.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore issues that can hamper 
efficiency of security agency operation and collaboration, and to identify actions that 
have enhanced collaboration. A search of professional literature has revealed that 
exploration of this subject is both desirable and useful, and that there has not been 
sufficient study of the factors that influence cooperative relationships among the many 
official agencies responsible for security in the nation’s transportation hubs.  
Specifically, the large seaport that has been the subject of this study, has not been 
studied from this perspective, even though multiple agencies must interact and work in 
symbiosis, to ensure the safety of the port, while respecting the rights of the various 
people and organizations who function within it. I have found that many inter 
organizational relationships exist—some that were mandated by official authority, and 
some that have developed through voluntary association among individuals and groups–
but that there exist issues that limit the effectiveness of the relationships. Some of these 
issues relate to a lack of cohesive guidance from official authority, some from conditions 
in which official guidance mandates interactional modes that hamper effective 
functioning of working level security personnel, and some that expend resources 
inefficiently, while failing to fulfill the intended purpose. Finally, while most 
organizations and individuals involved displayed a conscientious intention to perform 
their duties in a manner that achieved security without unnecessarily intruding upon the 
rights and freedoms of the people who use the port facilities, occasional incidents have 
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arisen in which such intrusions have occurred, and the potential for more, and 
increasingly serious intrusions have continued to exist. 
There was evidence of a general recognition among the organizations of the 
necessity of maintaining the trust of the protected public. Several interviewees 
acknowledged that their effectiveness depended on trust and cooperation from the 
population. Some of the observations also revealed courteous, and in one case, active 
cooperation between an agency member and a private citizen. Should this trust and 
mutual respect deteriorate, agency members acknowledged that the results would be very 
negative the protectors and protected, alike. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The kinds of cultural norms and models described by Schein (2010) proved to be 
extant in the current study environment, having been fostered and perpetuated in the 
manner that Schein predicted. Furthermore, as Schein described the conditions that must 
exist in order to infer the presence of organizational culture, the observations must reveal 
that the norms of the group are recognized by the members as appropriate for 
accomplishment of shared goals and intentions. The norms must also be seen as 
sufficiently valuable to be included as part of the orientation of new members who join 
the group. The presence of such norms was evidenced in various ways throughout the 




We all have our own ways of working together. I mean, you can’t work with the 
same crew all the time and not have regular habits. Usually, that is in some of the 
routine jobs, especially records and reports. Some [personnel] are better at some 
of the jobs, but not as good at others, so we divide things up. As long as 
everybody gets fair treatment, it works. It just comes from working together a 
long time. Newbies [sic] come in, and they have to get used to it, and we have to 
get used to them. Of course, they usually start with some of the jobs nobody 
wants, but we try to keep it fair. If it gets too out of line, people stop getting 
along, and that’s bad for everybody (participant S-5, personal communication, 
November 2, 2014). 
Through the literature search, I discovered reports that added some examples of 
research applications of Schein’s models. For example, Solansky and Beck (2009) found 
that some interorganizational cultures developed shared acknowledgement of the 
importance of collaboration among organizations. These organizations tended to achieve 
increased effectiveness and shortened response times in addressing threats. This shared 
acknowledgement, or belief, was seen to manifest itself in collective commitment to 
collaboration. This cooperation extended, when necessary, to the protected public, as 
well. 
The professed commitment, identified in Solansky and Beck’s paper, was 
consistent with the second level of culture, as described in Schein’s book. This 
phenomenon was corroborated in Blair and Janousek (2013), who found that cooperative 
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interagency relationships tend to be informal. Even when starting as formal, directed 
relationships, Blair and Janousek (2013) discovered that these relationships tended to 
evolve, over time, into informal interactive protocols that participants found to be 
functional. 
A negative, but useful example of research that can be related to Schein (2010) 
was Garrett’s (2010) study, which found that failures of large, interagency organizations 
to develop shared acknowledgement of the need for collaboration, resulted in substantial 
inertia and general dysfunction in the larger organization. Garrett’s descriptions of these 
problems were comparable to the understood, tacit sorts of belief (or lack thereof) 
existing in the third cultural level described in Schein’s book. Specific observations cited 
in the Garrett study indicated that this underlying assumption was lacking. Absence of 
this shared assumption was consistent with the behavioral actions contained in the first 
level of culture described by Schein.  Schemeil (2013), found that organizations tended to 
find new modes of cooperation as a means of surviving changes in their organizational 
mandates. 
Garrett  (2010) viewed the observed behaviors to be both symptoms and results of 
the failure of organizational leadership to foster the kinds of cultural development 
necessary for effective functioning of interagency organizations. The leadership failures 
were examples of the type described theoretically in Schein’s (2010) book. Finally, 
Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) found that existing organizational cultural norms, which 
were described in a manner that was consistent with Schein’s model, increased the 
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likelihood that multilevel, and multiagency organizations would coalesce successfully, to 
make efficient use of available resources. In general, the literature search revealed that 
the organizational culture models provided by Schein (2010) would serve effectively as a 
conceptual framework for the entire research project. 
A final contribution from Schein’s (2010) work has been the role of leadership in 
making organizational intentions work in a practical manner. Whether in the formal, 
hierarchical structure of the organizations, or within ad hoc work groupings, or with 
informal relationships that have formed, leadership was consistently acknowledged 
during the interview process. This effect was occasionally evident during the observation 
phase of the study. Even though opportunities for directly identifying leadership actions 
were rare, there was evidence of leadership influences on organizational behavior, in the 
manner that Schein described.  
Discussion with participants on the subject of the types of security threats they 
recognized revealed that they were generally aware of, and felt responsibility for 
mitigating, the threats Lutz, Roell, and Thiele (2013) defined. These threat types included 
terrorism, smuggling, and crimes against persons or property. This shared recognition and 
commitment tended to enhance cohesiveness among members of the organizations 
included in the study, and helped maintain a shared sense of purpose. A clear deficit in 
threat recognition was the general lack of focus on the potential for cyber threats. Even 
though all participants exhibited a significant dependence on electronic, networked 
devices for their routine functioning, few of them mentioned cyber security as a threat, 
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and none expressed any personal responsibility for it. As Kramek (2013) discovered, 
many people in security jobs lack this recognition, although nearly all have an 
opportunity to at least monitor the performance of their own equipment for evidence of 
cyber intrusion or disruption. I noted a similar lack of awareness among participants in 
the current study. 
One interesting phenomenon noted in the study related to the work by Chalk and 
Rosenau (2004), who found that security agencies, especially those in the United States, 
often have difficulty coordinating and cooperating, because of a variety of factors. These 
factors include variations in priorities and policies, limited jurisdictions, and political 
competition among the agencies involved. While these same kinds of factors were 
evident in the research environment, there was evidence of a considerable amount of 
mitigating activity. Some of this took the form of official policy coordination among 
local authorities, but much of it was achieved through personal initiative of individuals 
and small groups, who recognized the mutual benefit of agreeing to, and maintaining 
such informal protocols.  
Chappell and Gibson (2009) noted a similar issue, and found that considerable 
controversy exists concerning the compatibility of large-scale security maintenance with 
the practice of community policing. In the present study, a philosophy of community 
policing was evident among many of the participants, and was also recognized in official 
doctrine. In this case, the evidence supported an argument in favor of community 
policing, in that the process has been generally successful, both in minimizing locally 
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based crime, and in maintaining effective focus on the larger scale issues of terrorism and 
smuggling. Because no evidence emerged to indicate that there were any conflicts 
attributable to community policing practices, the data have supported the argument in 
favor of continuing the policy in the port. 
As Parks et al. (2013) discovered, coordination among agencies, and 
communication with affected members of the agencies, is vital when making policy or 
major procedural changes. Without this coordination and communication, policies are 
likely to be inconsistently perceived by organization members, with a resulting negative 
effect on perceptions of the public who are affected by their implementation. Overman et 
al. (2014) found that negative perceptions by the protected public can result in mistrust 
and loss of the kind of willing public cooperation on which effective security measures 
depend. According to the Overman work, thoughtful and thorough coordination of 
proposed policy changes are vital to their successful implementation, which, in turn, 
result in public benefit from the changes. 
Some significant negative issues also emerged in the course of the study. One was 
the kind of problem explored by Woods and Bowman (2011), in which competition 
among agencies for federal funding and other types of sponsorship can be a major 
impediment to cooperation among agencies. This was definitely evident in the views of 
most of my study participants, many of whom cited either competition for money or 
jurisdictional authority as factors that interfered with their ability to openly cooperate 
with peers from other agencies. While some agencies had found ways to cooperate 
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effectively, others did not. Resource and jurisdictional competition was clearly the 
dominant factor in the noncooperative situations. 
Other negative findings included the lack of emphasis on cyber security, 
mentioned previously, and the limited use, among study participants, of the resources 
devoted to the Fusion Center. As Leithauser (2012) found to be widespread among such 
facilities, there was little evidence in the study environment of any significant use of this 
entity among security personnel at the working level. 
The prima facie evidence is very strong that the security operations in the subject 
port are effective and appropriate to the prevailing conditions. This is because no major 
incidents have occurred, despite the fact that there is credible evidence that the 
recognized threats remain. On the other hand, most of the agencies involved in the study 
have had the unfortunate experience of having some of their members lose their lives in 
the line of duty. Clearly, the threats remain, and vigilance against them must be 
maintained. 
For these reasons, any actions that may enhance the ability of the people who are 
charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the port facilities to carry out their duties 
without undue risk to themselves are clearly welcome. At the same time, the safeguarding 
must be done in a way that recognizes the rights of people engaged in legitimate activities 
to go about their business with minimum impediment. These vital, simultaneous, and 
sometimes conflicting tasks must continue. If not, the public trust on which effective 
security depends would erode, with seriously negative consequences. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study has been limited by a number of factors including sample size, time, 
and geography. While necessary for practicability of the study, they did result in some 
limitations to the breadth and detail of the conclusions. Each of these limitations will be 
treated separately. 
First among limitations was the limited number of participants interviewed. 
Although an adequate number have been included for the purpose of engaging a 
representative sample, it has been, nevertheless, a sample, which is subject to the 
limitations of sampling techniques. While the consistency of resultant data has revealed 
that the sample has been adequate, it is still possible that a larger sample might render 
some differences in findings. 
Time has also been a limiting factor. As stated in the discussion of research 
design, the timeframe allocated for data collection has been limited to approximately two 
months. This has resulted in various limits, especially in the case of observation. Many of 
the kinds of incidents to which participants and their parent organizations must respond 
occur only rarely. In fact, only three of the observed incidents required more than one 
organization to respond, and only seven incidents of nonresponse activities, such as 
lunchtime interactions or other collective activities, were observed during the course of 
the study. All of the observed activities were consistent with the outcomes of interviews, 
and were consistent with the general findings of the study. Even so, additional 
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observations, conducted over a longer period of time might have generated data that 
would have had an effect on findings and conclusions. 
The decision to limit the study within the boundaries of a single port also imposed 
limits on data collection. The waterways used by the subject port are also used by the 
neighboring port. Although no evidence of conflicting data attributable to the other port 
emerged during the course of the study, such conflicts may have existed and remained 
undetected. There may also have been interactions at the other port occurring among 
members of organizations from both ports. Observations of such interactions may, or may 
not have had a meaningful effect on interpretation of the total data set. 
A study encompassing a larger geographic area, involving a greater number of 
organizations, over a longer period of time, might possibly yield some differences in 
results. While the evidence gathered during the current study was sufficiently consistent 
and compelling to indicate that it is probably valid, a larger scaled study would be likely 
to provide amplifying information, with additional conclusions and indications that 
would enhance the value of the pursuit.  
Recommendations 
Further research into some of the issues treated in this study could yield additional 
benefit. Although interview responses were generally consistent with one another, a 
larger sample size might yield additional useful detail. Because of the time limitation, 
additional observations might provide insights into specific kinds of interactions resulting 
from actual incidents that would require large scale, cooperative action by multiple 
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agencies. Finally, further study beyond the geographical boundaries of the selected 
research environment would probably provide interesting results. This could be 
especially true if a similar study were to be done in the neighboring port, using similar 
approaches and techniques. 
I also found unforeseen issues that were beyond the scope of the current work, 
and exploration of these issues warrants further study. One such issue is the matter of 
cyber security. Specifically, a detailed look at the kinds of activities to mitigate the cyber 
threats would certainly be valuable. As Solansky and Beck (2009) recommended, 
examination of efforts to coordinate activities among agencies might be especially 
valuable. Similarly, further study of the actual role of the Fusion Center, and the manner 
in which its capabilities and resources are used would probably prove useful. The 
suggestions offered by Caldwell (2012), concerning procedural integration of Fusion 
Center capabilities with other security activities, were found to be applicable here, and, as 
Caldwell had noted in other environments, should receive further attention. 
 Finally, as Adams and Balfour (2010) noted, it is very important to be 
aware of the risks of institutional competition for resources and its potential effect on 
cooperative action. Several participants acknowledged the presence of this kind of 
competition. The implications of such competition could be profoundly negative, and will 




All of the participants in the study expressed a sincere recognition that the 
principal goal of their jobs and their organizations was to maintain the safety of the 
public, in their persons, their property, and their legitimate activities. Measures taken to 
accomplish the necessary level of security are, in themselves, forces of social change. 
The question of whether the resulting social change will be positive or negative hinges 
largely on the manner in which these security measures are implemented, public 
perception of the appropriateness of the measures, and, of course, the effectiveness of the 
measures. 
To ensure that these measures are imposed and received in a positive way, it is 
necessary that management of the processes for providing security be established and 
maintained wisely. These issues were clearly demonstrated during the research by Parks 
et al. (2013), who discovered that organizational leaders could exert a strong influence on 
the perceptions of public employees, depending on the manner in which they presented 
and enforced active and interactive protocols. Without such positive influences, a 
frightening, but very possible scenario could be that some major incident would generate 
political pressure to make sudden, substantial changes in the way security is maintained. 
If high-level institutional pressures were to cause hasty and potentially inappropriate 
decisions, the consequences could be tragically negative. The importance of this issue 
was evident at the research site, where agency members acknowledged their dependence 
on a cooperative public.  
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Such claims were evident in the findings of Overman et al. (2014), who likewise 
found that high-level negotiations for changes in policy or interactive protocols should be 
thoroughly worked out in advance of presenting them to lower level organizations and 
personnel, to help prevent friction and resistance to change incorporation. Should security 
practitioners at the working level find themselves in a position of having to implement 
new policies they do not believe to be effective, or which increase the personal risks to 
which they are exposed, the level of commitment to public safety which they have shown 
to be paramount in their minds would inevitably diminish. Without these preparatory 
measures and sympathetic direction from leadership, frustration and fear would begin to 
replace enthusiasm. 
Such frustration and fear would inevitably affect the manner in which security 
practitioners would interact with the very public they were charged with protecting. 
Public perceptions of their protectors would be negatively affected, and the level of trust 
and cooperation that presently exists would diminish. As stated in the Findings section, 
cooperation and tolerance of security measures by the general public are indispensable to 
effective security activity. In such a scenario, the social change imposed by the 
recognition of growing security threats would be decidedly negative (see p. 113). 
Instead, it is hoped that findings from studies such as this one will enhance the 
ability of policy makers to recognize factors that have produced favorable results, as well 
as factors that have not. For example, recognizing interactive protocols that are already in 
place and functioning satisfactorily could help smooth the introduction of additional tasks 
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or security measures. I have found this kind of recognition to have positive results in the 
present study. On the other hand, unrealistic expectations of the value of new measures 
can result in resignation and cynicism among personnel who are expected to use them. 
This has also been observed in the present study.  
With this kind of information at their disposal, policy makers should be better 
prepared to respond appropriately to any change in the security environment for which 
they are responsible. In such a case, the vital trust by the protected public in the necessary 
laws and regulations, as well as in the people who must enforce them, will remain secure. 
With this trust and cooperation maintained, the ability of the protectors and the protected 
to carry on their legitimate activities will be minimally affected by unavoidable outside 
forces. This would be the optimum scenario in a society that recognizes the necessity to 
remain safe, while still preserving, to the greatest extent practicable, their individual and 
collective freedoms. 
Conclusion 
My conduct of this study has proved to be both enlightening and gratifying. It has 
been enlightening in that it has revealed that a complex mix of organizations, with 
collective responsibility for managing an even more complex set of tasks can work 
effectively and efficiently. This has proved to be largely attributable to the many people 
who each take their personal responsibilities seriously, and who display a high degree of 
professional integrity in carrying out their duties. 
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The experience has been gratifying, because, even though ongoing efforts have 
been effective in preventing major incidents of crime and terrorism, my work has 
revealed that there are some kinds of activities and processes that could be improved. The 
improvements, if implemented, could materially enhance the ability of the organizations 
and individuals to perform their work even better than they already do. Additionally, 
these kinds of improvements would also aid the addition of new responses to new threats 
as they emerge. As a result, the society that enjoys the protection they are currently 
receiving could continue to reap the quiet and mostly invisible benefit of a secure and 
largely unobtrusive protective environment. Any social change necessitated by current 
and future security threats would thus continue to be substantially positive. 
Clearly, security of the port continues to be effectively maintained. This is due to 
the work of competent and dedicated people, who are committed to the jobs they are 
assigned to do. Even so, there remain threats that should be addressed more actively. 
Fortunately, there are people and processes in place that, given adequate support and 
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Appendix A: Consent Form 
This consent form will be used for all participants. Anyone who signs a form will 
receive a copy of the form with both the participant and interviewer’s signatures. 
 
Consent Form 
You are invited to take part in a research study of inter-agency security operations 
within the area of the seaport. To conduct the study, it is necessary to interview and 
observe people whose professional duties include activities necessary for maintaining 
security in the port and its environs. Because of your position in a security organization, 
you have been identified as someone who would be appropriate to participate in the 
study, if you are willing to do so. This form is part of a process known as “informed 
consent” to allow you to understand this study before deciding whether to take part. 
This study is being conducted by Ed Levy, who is a doctoral student at Walden 
University. 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to describe the manner in which the many agencies 
involved in providing port security interact. This includes formal relationships which are 
defined by official policy, and informal relationships that form among professional 





If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to: 
• Be interviewed about the nature of your duties and the kinds of organizational 
interfaces you have with people from other organizations. The interview is brief, 
and should not require more than thirty minutes of your time. In some cases, a 
follow-up interview may be needed, so you can help explain or clarify some 
information that the researcher obtains during the course of the study. 
• Be observed in your work environment, perform your normal duties. 
• Suggest inclusion of official, publicly-releasable documentation that provides 
guidance for you in executing your duties and interfacing with other 
organizations. 
 
Here are some sample questions: 
• What is your job title? 
• To what security organization do you belong? 
• What other organizations are normally involved in your work? 
• How well do you think the cooperative relationships work? 
• If there are issues, what do you think causes them? 
• How do issues usually get resolved? 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
The study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision, whether you choose to 
participate or not. No one at any of the agencies involved will treat you any differently if 
you decide not to participate. If you decide to join the study and change your mind later, 
you can still change your mind later. You can leave the study at any time. 
 
Risks and Benefits of the Study: 
Because this is a non-intrusive study, and neither you nor anyone else will be asked to do 
anything other than your normal work activities, the only risks that might be incurred are 
potential risks to privacy. These risks may be divided into two categories: 
 Risks to your personal privacy. 
 Risks of disclosure of information that your organization may consider sensitive. 
Protective measures to safeguard your personal privacy are described in the Privacy 
section below. 
Protection for organizational information will be provided by special measures to keep 
observational and interview data secure, and by including key individuals within the 
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affected organizations in the process of vetting the observations and findings, in order to 
prevent inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. 
 
Privacy: 
Any information you provide will be kept anonymous, and will not be attributed to you in 
any report or document. Your identity will be assigned a code which will not have any 
link to other documents associated with the study report. Further, all participants, even 
those who are willing to be identified, will be kept anonymous. This is to prevent 
inadvertent “identification by omission” or other deductive means of identifying 
participants. Data will be kept for at least five years, and all protections, both 
documentary and systemic, will be maintained throughout that time. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
You may ask any questions you have now. If you want to talk privately about your rights 
as a participant, you may call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University 
representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is X-XXX-XXX-
XXXX, extension XXXXXX. The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep, 
and you should keep it for your records. 
 
Printed name of participant: ________________________________________ 
Date of consent:  ________________________________________ 
Participant’s signature: ________________________________________ 




Appendix B: Interview Worksheets 
The following worksheets to be used in the interview process.  
 
INTERVIEW WORKSHEET  
• What is the role of your organization in the port? 
 
• How does your organization share security responsibility with other 
organizations? 
 
• What other organizations do you interface with? 
 
• How are decisions regarding security operations made between your organization 
and others? 
• Does your organization function independently in security work, or does your 
organization take direction from some other authority? 
• Are you aware of any high-level policy that comes from outside your 
organization? If so, where does it come from? 
• What kinds of informal working relationships have you formed with members of 
your own organization? 
• How did these relationships develop? 
• What kinds of informal working relationships do you have with members of other 
organizations? 
• How did these relationships develop? 
• Are there any problems between the informal working relationships and the 
official direction that governs your work? 




• Among these, which ones are you involved in mitigating? 
 
• How is your involvement defined and assigned to you? 
 
• How secure do you feel in your working environment? 
 
• What factors contribute to your personal feelings about security? 
 
• What, if any, security threats do you think should be added to your assigned 
duties? 
• If there are additional threats, why should you be involved with them, and what 
would be your role in mitigating them? 
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Appendix C. Sample Introduction Letter for Potential Participants 
Dear _____ 
As part of my academic program at Walden University, I am conducting a study 
at the Port, concerning interagency coordination for maintenance of security within the 
Port environment. Because of your position in the research environment, you may be able 
to help me, by answering some questions about the mission and tasks of your 
organization. 
Should you choose to participate, I will contact you to arrange a meeting, during 
which I will explain details of my study, and ask you some questions that will help me 
gain understanding of the security situation at the Port, and the manner in which security 
is maintained. Your participation is, of course, totally voluntary, and your identity and 
participation will be kept completely confidential. At the time of our meeting, I will 
provide you with a privacy guarantee document, and that we will each sign and retain a 
copy. 
Your participation will not only be helpful to me in the conduct of my study, but 
may also help identify factors that enhance Port security, and perhaps also factors that 
detract from it. But, whether you choose to participate or not, I appreciate your 
consideration of my request, and look forward to meeting you in person. 
Warm Regards, 
Ed Levy 
